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THE  IMPRESSIVE  economic  performance of many Asian economies  dur- 
ing the past three decades is now an old story. The growth of per capita 
GDP averaged over 4 percent in China and the major East Asian econ- 
omies  (Indonesia,  Korea,  Malaysia,  the Philippines,  Singapore,  Tai- 
wan,  and Thailand) between  1960 and 1994,  compared with less  than 
2 percent  in other developing  economies  and 2.6  percent  among  the 
industrial  countries.'  East  Asia  stands out  as  the  only  region  where 
living  standards are catching up to those in industrial countries,  while 
other parts of the developing  world seem to be struggling to either tread 
water or fall further and further behind (see  table  1). 
The exemplary performance of many East Asian economies  has been 
the  basis  for  a  large  and varied  literature,  much  of  which  explores 
reasons  for the persistently  high  growth  and draws lessons  for other 
countries  that would  like  to  follow  suit.  A  surprising  aspect  of  this 
literature is the lack of  agreement on fundamental aspects  of the per- 
formance  record  that analysts  seek  to  explain.  Is  the basis  for  East 
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Table 1. Basic Indicators  of Economic  Growth, by Region and Countrya 
Units  as indicated 
Per capita 
incomec  Growth rates,  1960-94d 
Region and  Population 
country  I990b  1960  1990  GDP  Population  Labor force 
China  1,134  0.6  1.3  6.8  1.8  2.3 
East  Asia  380  0.9  3.6  6.8  2.2  2.5 
Indonesia  178  0.6  2.0  5.7  2.1  2.2 
Korea  43  0.9  6.7  8.5  1.7  2.6 
Malaysia  18  1.4  5.1  7.0  2.6  3.0 
Philippines  61  1.1  1.8  3.8  2.7  2.5 
Singapore  3  1.6  11.7  8.3  1.7  2.7 
Thailand  56  0.9  3.6  7.7  2.4  2.5 
Taiwan  20  1.3  8.1  8.7  2.1  2.7 
South  Asia  1,130  0.8  1.1  4.2  2.3  1.9 
Africa  432  0.6  0.7  2.9  2.8  2.6 
Middle  East  175  1.9  3.0  4.5  2.9  2.9 
Latin  America  421  2.4  4.1  4.2  2.4  2.7 
Industrial  countries  853  6.4  14.9  3.5  0.9  1.1 
Source: Population and GDP are the authors' calculations based on data from the World Bank's CD-ROM World Data 
1995 (hereafter referred to by its title alone). Per capita income is calculated using data from the Penn-World Tables, mark 
5.6  (accessed via the worldwide web page of the National Bureau of Economic Research). Labor force numbers are from 
unpublished data provided by the International Labour Organisation. 
a. Computed using the eighty-eight country sample. Regional averages are calculated by weighting each country by its 
average GDP over 1960-94,  as measured in 1985 dollars. 
b. Millions. 
c. Thousands of  1985 dollars. 
d. Annual percentage rate. 
Asian  growth  the  maintenance  of  high  rates of  physical  and human 
capital accumulation over a number of decades-a  willingness  to make 
the sacrifices of current consumption necessary to invest for the future? 
Or has the key been the less costly  approach of adopting existing  tech- 
nologies  from more advanced economies,  which may be associated with 
increased capital accumulation  along the way? 
Establishing  which  of these  characterizations  is correct is a crucial 
first step in extracting appropriate lessons  from East Asian growth ex- 
periences and is a primary motivation for this paper. If the accumulation 
view  is correct,  these experiences  reinforce the lesson  that to improve 
living  standards requires  investment,  paid  for  in  large  part through 
forgone  current consumption.  The alternative assessment,  which  Paul 
Romer has referred to as narrowing the  "idea  gap,"  implies  a much 
more  optimistic  message.2  No  opportunity  cost  need  be  incurred to 
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incorporate  ideas.  Instead,  they  could  be  transmitted  to  the  mutual 
benefit  of  suppliers  and  recipients.  Deciphering  East  Asia's  rapid 
growth would thus hold forth the promise of a much less  steep road to 
prosperity. 
A long list of authors implicitly  or explicitly  highlights  productivity 
growth as the key  to East Asian  success.  One strand of  literature has 
engaged  in a debate over the role of government policies  (particularly 
microeconomic)  in achieving  productivity increases.  In the early incar- 
nation of this debate,  some pointed to high-growth Asian economies  as 
proof that "market friendly"  approaches, including the maintenance of 
an open trading regime,  promoted increased  efficiency.3  Others char- 
acterized government  strategies in the region as targeted intervention, 
not  laissez-faire,  arguing that the experiences  showed  how  "getting 
prices wrong"  and picking  winners were the road to catching up with 
industrialized nations.4 Thus the same group of countries became poster 
children for conflicting  policy  advice.  Views  in this debate have moved 
somewhat closer over time. In particular, there is now broad recognition 
that the high-growth  Asian  economies  exhibit  a range of government 
strategies,  from extreme laissez-faire  to extensive  intervention in some 
sectors.  A growing  number of analysts have also concluded  that some 
interventions were beneficial.5 However,  considerable disagreement re- 
mains over the importance and transferability of  active  intervention.6 
This  debate  still  centers  on  the  role  of  the  public  sector  versus  the 
private sector in generating productivity growth. 
A  second  strand of  literature stems  from  dissatisfaction  with  the 
ability  of  traditional  growth  models  to  explain  observed  features  of 
economic  growth.7 The  result has been  an exploration  of  alternative 
frameworks,  known  collectively  as  models  of  endogenous  growth. 
Some of the underlying ideas can be found in the development  literature 
of  the  1950s  and  1960s,  but the associated  explosion  of  attention to 
how rapid economic  growth may be spurred by increases  in efficiency 
is certainly new.  In these models,  while productivity gains may induce 
3.  See World  Bank (1993a) and, more  recently, Krueger  (1995). 
4.  See Amsden  (1989, 1991, 1994), Wade (1990), and Fishlow and others  (1994). 
5.  See for example, World  Bank (1993a), Krugman  (1992), and Stiglitz (1996). 
6.  See, in particular,  the debate  that  followed  the publication  of World  Bank  (1993a); 
for example, Singh (1994), Page (1994), Ito (1994), and Ito and Krueger  (1995). 
7.  See, for example,  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1995), Grossman  and  Helpman  (1991, 
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capital accumulation so that the two are observed to grow hand in hand, 
it  is  the productivity  gains,  not capital  formation  per se,  that is  the 
fundamental cause of growth.8 
The following  quotations imply an acceptance of the view that rapid 
economic  growth,  such  as that seen  in East Asia,  can largely  be ex- 
plained by successfully  catching  up with technology:  "The  optimistic 
view of the potential for development  suggested by idea gaps is consis- 
tent with the experience  of a few,  very rapidly growing  economies.  In 
fact,  a rapidly  closing  idea  gap offers  the best  way  to explain  these 
cases of dramatic success."  And,  "the source of growth in a few Asian 
economies  was their ability to extract relevant technological  knowledge 
from industrial economies  and utilize it productively within the domes- 
tic economy.'9 
This literature has also looked for policy  lessons,  and many authors 
have concluded  that openness to trade, imports of capital goods,  direct 
foreign investment,  financial development,  and macroeconomic  stabil- 
ity can help countries to grow by closing  technology  gaps. These claims 
are based  on  a combination  of  cross-country  growth  regressions  and 
evidence  from industry- and firm-level  studies."' 
Not  so fast,  argue a growing  number of empirical  studies that find 
little or no evidence  that East Asia's  rapid growth has been associated 
with rapid productivity growth or closing  the knowledge  or technology 
gap.  The best known  of these  studies  are Alwyn  Young's  growth ac- 
counting  papers examining  the composition  of  growth in Korea,  Tai- 
wan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Jong-Il Kim and Lawrence Lau, using 
regression  analysis  to  estimate  underlying  production  functions,  are 
unable to reject the hypothesis of no technical progress in the same four 
economies.  " If these  studies  are correct,  and efficiency  gains  are not 
lead actors in the Asian  success  stories,  then debates over the roles of 
government  and the  private  sector  in  raising  productivity,  while  of 
interest  in their own  right,  cannot  hope  to  uncover  the lessons  from 
Asian experience. 
This  paper  revisits  the  issue  of  the  sources  of  East  Asia's  rapid 
8.  See Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  (1992), Romer  (1990), King and Levine (1994). 
9.  Romer  (1993, p. 547); Pack (1992, p. 299). 
10. See,  for example, Bell and Pavitt (1992),  Pack (1992), Romer (1993),  and 
Fagerberg  (1994). 
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growth  in  output.  The  empirical  framework  is  provided  by  a set  of 
growth accounts that decompose  the growth in output per worker from 
1960 to  1994 into the contributions from the accumulation of physical 
and human capital and a residual measure of the change in total factor 
productivity  (TFP).  Our methodology  is  simpler,  and therefore more 
transparent, than many of  the other growth accounting  studies  in the 
literature.  Furthermore, we  apply a common  methodology  to eighty- 
eight  developing  and industrial countries,  including  East Asian  econ- 
omies  as well  as countries from other regions  at all levels  of develop- 
ment.  We  focus  on  seven  East  Asian  economies:  Indonesia,  Korea, 
Malaysia,  the Philippines,  Singapore,  Taiwan,  and Thailand. China is 
included  in the  sample  but is  treated separately  because  of  concerns 
about the data. Japan is  included  among the industrial countries,  not 
East Asia. 
Growth accounting  has recently been subject to criticism because  it 
cannot identify the fundamental causes of growth. However,  this is not 
its objective.  It provides  a consistent  decomposition  of growth among 
its proximate sources,  which  we believe  is very informative.  This ap- 
proach also avoids some of the problems associated  with cross-country 
regression  analyses.  In particular, it has been  widely  recognized  that 
because  such  studies  suffer  from  simultaneity,  multicolinearity,  and 
limited  degrees  of  freedom,  their results  should  be  interpreted with 
caution. 12 Note  also  that growth accounting  does  not require taking a 
stand on the appropriate underlying model of growth. There is no need 
to choose  between  a neoclassical  framework,  in which  technology  is 
identical across countries and technical  progress is exogenously  deter- 
mined,  and the many alternative frameworks in which technology  may 
differ across countries and the accumulation of knowledge  is an endog- 
enous process. 
The central result of our empirical  analysis  reinforces  those  studies 
that have concluded  that TFP growth played  a surprisingly small role 
in East Asia's  success.  The main lessons  of this success  come not from 
identifying which policies  best promote TFP growth, but how countries 
can achieve and sustain high rates of saving and investment.  The saving 
and investment  record in East Asia  has been  impressive,  and govern- 
12. See Mankiw (1995) for one exposition of the difficulties with the empirical 
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ment policies  may well have been a key contributor to this accomplish- 
ment.  Further, we  emphasize  that East Asia  has  avoided  the fate  of 
other regions where large negative productivity shocks sharply lowered 
the level  of TFP. With the exception  of the Philippines,  improvements 
in  efficiency  consistently  made  positive  (if  small)  contributions  to 
growth in the region. 
Finding little TFP growth among these countries is not new.  Indeed, 
our results are similar to Young's  in this regard. The main contributions 
of our work fall  into three areas. The first is its extensive  coverage- 
particularly  within  East  Asia.  Other  studies  typically  focus  on  two 
countries (Korea and Taiwan) and two tiny city-states  (Hong Kong and 
Singapore)  whose  experience  may be  of  limited  relevance  for  larger 
economies.  In its inclusion of Indonesia, Malaysia,  the Philippines,  and 
Thailand, our analysis represents a significant expansion of information 
about developments  in the region.  Our large sample enables us to make 
comparisons  across  countries  and  time  periods  such  that  different 
experiences  cannot  be  attributed to methodological  inconsistencies. 
We  are able  to  study  the  robustness  of  Young's  conclusions  which, 
because  they  are based  on  a very  detailed  decomposition,  cannot be 
contrasted directly with those for other countries.  We also examine the 
relationship  between  factor  accumulation  and productivity  growth  in 
these economies. 
Second,  our analysis  clarifies  why  some previous  studies  have un- 
deremphasized  the  importance  of  capital  accumulation  in East Asia. 
We  show  that using  investment  to  proxy  physical  or human capital 
accumulation  can be very  misleading.  These  proxies  are surprisingly 
uncorrelated with changes  in capital stocks.  Furthermore, they lead to 
severe underestimates of the role of physical capital in explaining  high 
Asian growth.  We also examine  the ways of measuring human capital 
accumulation.  We argue that using years of schooling  directly is prob- 
lematic.  Because  of  the  way  in  which  it treats those  with  no formal 
education,  this method overstates growth in human capital for countries 
with low initial levels  of education relative to our labor quality index, 
which weights  labor on the basis of returns to schooling.  This alterna- 
tive implies  a larger, though still modest,  contribution to growth from 
increased schooling  in East Asia relative to other regions. 
Third, we use the decomposition  of growth into factor accumulation 
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in  initial  conditions,  the  external  environment,  and some  aspects  of 
government policy  have affected the growth process.  In some cases  the 
roles  of  various policies  can be evaluated by examining  the extent  to 
which they are correlated with changes in factor accumulation as against 
gains in the efficiency  with which the factors are used. 
In the  sections  that follow,  we  explain  the construction  of  the ac- 
counts and discuss the results as they bear on the East Asian experience. 
We  use the resulting  data to explore  the context  in which  East Asian 
economic  growth has been distinctive.  Is there,  as emphasized  by the 
new growth literature, a positive  correlation between  capital accumu- 
lation and factor productivity gains and, if so, was it important for East 
Asia?  Proceeding  from our emphasis  on the dominant role of  capital 
accumulation,  we  examine  a  further issue  raised  by  Paul  Krugman 
(based on Young's  analysis):  whether or not East Asian  growth must 
inevitably  slow  down. '  We  suggest  that there is  some  evidence  that 
these economies  are evolving  toward a greater emphasis  on TFP gains 
and that future growth can be sustained. 
Construction  of the Accounts 
Growth accounts make it possible to decompose  the change in output 
into the contributions of factor accumulation and a residual measure of 
gains in the efficiency  with which the factors are used.  Most previous 
studies  have  been  restricted  to  a select  few  countries  for  which  the 
researcher was  able to obtain the required information  from national 
sources. 14 In recent years the situation has been changed by the devel- 
opment of several large international data sets.  We use these data sets 
to construct growth accounts  that, while  simpler than those  available 
from other sources,  cover  a large  number of  economies  over  an ex- 
tended period.  Thus  they  augment the  other studies  by  employing  a 
standardized and transparent methodology  to compare the growth ex- 
perience  of  a large  number of  countries.  Comparisons  can  be  made 
between the growth experience  in East Asia and in the industrial coun- 
13.  Krugman (1994). 
14.  Three of  the  most  detailed  recent  examples  are Elias  (1992),  covering  seven 
Latin American countries; Hofman (I1993), comparing six Latin American countries with 
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tries and developing  economies  in other regions,  without concern  for 
differences  in methodology. 
We construct indexes of real output, the capital stock, and a measure 
of the education-adjusted work force for eighty-eight  countries over the 
period  1960-94.  The  choice  of  countries  is  limited  primarily by  the 
availability  of  national accounts  data and measures of educational  at- 
tainment,  but the result provides  very good coverage  of the major re- 
gions:  East Asia  (eight countries),  South Asia  (five),  sub-Saharan Af- 
rica  (twenty-one),  the  Middle  East  and North  Africa  (nine),  Latin 
America (twenty-two),  and the industrial countries (twenty-three). '5 In 
addition,  we use an updated version of the Penn-World Tables (PWT) 
to obtain relative  levels  of  output and capital per worker in common 
international prices (see below). 
The  neoclassical  analysis  of  economic  growth  starts with  the  as- 
sumption  of  a stable underlying  relationship  between  output (Q),  the 
inputs capital (K) and labor (L), and technology  (A): 
(1)  Qt =  F(Kt, L, At). 
L is  used  to denote  a skill-adjusted  measure of  the labor input,  such 
that 
(2)  L  =  HL, 
where H is an index of labor quality.  In concept,  the growth accounts 
can be constructed  to yield  estimates  of  total factor productivity  that 
are  independent  of  the  parameters or  functional  form  of  the  above 
production process.  It is only necessary  to assume a degree of compe- 
tition  sufficient  to ensure that the earnings of  the factors  are propor- 
tionate to their factor productivities.  The shares of income  paid to the 
factors  can  then be  used  to  measure  their relative  importance  in the 
production process.  That is,  an index of growth in total factor produc- 
tivity,  denoted by a(t),  can be defined as the growth rate of output, q(t), 
less  the share-weighted  growth of the factor inputs, k(t) andI (t): 
(3)  a(t)  =  q(t)  -  Skk(t) -  s, (t). 
As  discussed  below,  we  are compelled  to use  fixed  weights-an  as- 
sumption that is only consistent  with a more limited  set of production 
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functions-in  the construction of the indexes.  Furthermore, any devia- 
tion from constant returns to scale  is allocated  to the residual of total 
factor productivity. 
Output Growth 
The basic output measure is gross domestic product in national prices 
of  1987,  from the World Bank's CD-ROM World Data  1995.  Because 
of  data revisions  and some  reporting errors,  we  substitute  measures 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for 
Economic  Co-operation  and Development  (OECD) in a few  cases.  An 
alternative measure of GDP in international prices with a base year of 
1985 is available in the Penn-World Tables, mark 5.6.  16 While the PWT 
measure starts from the same national accounts data as the World Bank, 
it is converted to standard international prices by constructing indexes 
in national prices at the level of the three main components of real GDP 
(private consumption,  government  consumption,  and investment)  and 
forming a new aggregate using international price weights.  17 
The composition  of output measured in international prices can de- 
viate  from  that shown  by  the  standard national  accounts,  which  are 
measured in national prices.  Most of these differences  can be traced to 
wide variations across countries in the price of labor in nontraded prod- 
ucts, but they also reflect the influence of various restrictions on external 
trade that prevent an equalization of the domestic  and foreign prices of 
tradables.  In general,  for high-income  countries the conversion  to in- 
ternational prices raises the share of output devoted to investment (cap- 
ital  and skill  intensive)  and lowers  the  share devoted  to government 
consumption  (labor intensive).  The opposite  is true for poor countries. 
The measurement of output in common international prices is of great 
value  for comparing  levels  of  income  across countries.  However,  the 
international and the national price measures produce very similar es- 
timates of  output change. 18  Over the period  1960-90,  the correlation 
coefficient  between the two measures exceeds  0.95  for our sample. The 
difference  in the average  annual growth rate exceeds  one  percentage 
16. Accessed on the worldwide web page of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
17. For further  discussion, see Summers  and Heston (1991). 
18. The differences  in weights will have large  effects on the growth  in the aggregate 
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point in only  six countries; and in one such case,  China, the disparity 
reflects a special  revision  of the national source data by the authors of 
the PWT. 19 In this paper we report output growth in terms of national 
prices because  our data for these  are more up to date (through  1994) 
and capture some important data revisions. 
Physical  Capital 
The measure of  the capital  stock is based on a perpetual inventory 
estimation  with  a common  geometric  depreciation  rate of 0.04.  Esti- 
mates  of  the capital  stock  are normally  considered  unreliable  due to 
lack of information about the initial capital stock and the rate of depre- 
ciation.  However,  the researchers who developed  the World Bank data 
set devoted  substantial effort  to incorporating the results  of  previous 
studies  of  individual  or small  groups of  countries,  and they  obtained 
investment  data extending  as far back as  1950.20  The long time series 
on investment  is  significant  because  it reduces  the importance of  the 
assumption  about the  initial  stock.  For the East Asian  economies  in 
particular, where subsequent investment rates have been very high, any 
error in the estimate of the capital stock for the 1950s would be a very 
small portion of the stock available  in the 1980s and 1990s. 
An alternative approach, reflecting  skepticism  about estimating  the 
capital stock,  uses the gross investment rate as a proxy for the change 
in the capital stock.  The change in the capital stock is given  by 
(4)  AK =  I-dK, 
where  I  is  investment  and d  is  a measure  of  the  geometric  rate of 
depreciation.  Dividing  through by K and assuming a steady-state  con- 
stant value  (,y) for the inverse of the capital-to-output  ratio allows  the 
rate of  change  of  capital  (k)  to  be  measured by  the  investment  rate 
(i  =  IIQ): 
19. The six countries with large differences are China, Jordan,  Mali, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, and Rwanda.  In the case of China, the PWT  reflect  a special adjustment  to the 
underlying  national  accounts  over the period 1980-93 that reduced  the growth  rate of 
investment  by 40 percent  and that of consumption  by 30 percent. In the other  cases, it 
appears  that the World Bank measures  of GDP had been revised since the data were 
gathered  for the PWT. 
20.  Nehru  and Dhareshwar  (1993). We extend the estimates  through  1994 by using 
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(5)  k=  iy-d. 
Most previous cross-national  growth studies have relied on the invest- 
ment rate to measure capital accumulation.  The approach is typically 
justified either by the assumption of a steady state or by a linearization 
around a steady state.2' 
The choice  between  using a direct estimate of the capital stock and 
its steady-state  investment  equivalent  is critical to deciphering the dif- 
ferences  among  the  various  studies  that have  sought  to  explain  East 
Asian  growth.  The  growth  experience  of  many developing  countries 
over the past three decades  has been very far from the conditions  of a 
steady state, and the capital-to-output ratio has been far from constant. 
As a result the investment rate is a very poor proxy for the rate of capital 
accumulation.  In fact,  in our sample of eighty-eight  countries there is 
no significant correlation between the rate of change in the capital stock 
and the mean investment rate, even over a period as long as thirty-four 
years (see  figure 1 and the associated  table 2).22 
The newly industrializing economies  of Asia all have extraordinarily 
high rates of growth of the capital stock, but they are less distinctive  in 
terms of the share of output devoted to investment.  The combination of 
an elevated  investment  share and a rapid growth of output has yielded 
a very high rate of capital accumulation for these economies,  but there 
are other countries with high investment shares that have had less output 
growth. 
It is also possible  to use the PWT data to construct estimates  of the 
capital stock  in international prices.  However,  because  the growth in 
investment  spending  is the same  in national  and international prices, 
the choice between the two measures affects only the level of the capital 
input.23 
21.  See Mankiw,  Romer, and  Weil (1992) and  the studies  referenced  in Levine and 
Renelt (1992). 
22.  Under  the assumption  of linear  deviations  from a steady  state (Mankiw,  Romer, 
and  Weil, 1992), capital  accumulation  should  depend  on initial conditions  as well as on 
the investment  rate. To explore this relationship,  we add average  investment  rates to a 
regression  equation  explaining  variation  in our measure  of the contribution  of increases 
in physical  capital  per  worker.  The international  price investment  share  has a coefficient 
of only 0.03 and increases  the regression's  explanatory  power (R2)  by only 0.04.  The 
national price investment share adds no explanatory  power. Thus we conclude that 
investment  rates are very poor proxies  for capital  accumulation. 
23.  To construct  an estimate of the capital stock in international  prices, we adjust 146  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
Figure 1. Capital  Stock Growth  and Average  Investment  Rates, by Country,  1960-94 
Capital  stock  growth  (annual  percentage  rate) 
Taiwan  Korea 
0  -  Singapore 
Thailand 
10 
Indonesia  Malaysia  a 
-  *  *  a  ~~~~~~~~~Chitna 
Philippines  *  /  C 
1  0  105  20  25  30 
Investment rate (percent of GDp)a 
Source:  See table 2. 
a. Measured  in national  prices. 
Labor Inputs 
The measure of  the quantity of  labor is  actual employment  for the 
industrial countries  and for the other countries,  unpublished estimates 
of  the economically  active  (labor force)  population  from the Interna- 
tional  Labour Organisation  (ILO).  For many  countries,  data on  the 
economically  active  population  are available  only  every  five  or  ten 
years,  from population  surveys  or censuses.  The ILO has used  infor- 
mation on age-specific  labor force participation rates and more frequent 
population estimates  to develop  consistent  estimates  of the labor force 
at five-year  intervals  extending  over  the period  1960-90.  Those  par- 
ticipation rates are then interpolated and applied to annual estimates of 
the total population. 
the initial capital-to-output  ratio in line with the ratio of the investment  rate in national 
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Table 2.  Capital  Stock  Growth  and Average Investment  Rates,  by Region and 
Country,  1960-94a 
Units as indicated 
Investment ratec 
Capital  National  Interniational 
Region and country  stock growthb  prices  prices 
China  6.7  22.3  20.5 
East Asia  9.9  21.1  18.6 
Indonesia  8.3  18.1  17.1 
Korea  12.6  23.5  23.7 
Malaysia  10.0  25.6  23.5 
Philippines  6.0  19.8  15.3 
Singapore  13.1  33.2  31.2 
Thailand  10.6  25.6  18.1 
Taiwan  12.2  20.0  21.9 
South Asia  5.2  18.9  11.3 
Africa  4.8  19.0  9.5 
Middle East  7.1  19.0  12.6 
Latin America  5.4  21.4  16.9 
Industrial countries  4.5  20.8  24.5 
Source: Capital stock growth is calculated using data from Nehru and Dhareshwar  ( 1993). Investment rate data are from 
World Data 1995 (national prices) and the Penn-World Tables, mark 5.6 (international prices). 
a. Computed using the eighty-eight country sample. Regional averages are calculated by weighting each country by its 
average GDP over 1960-94,  as measured in 1985 dollars. 
b. Annual percentage rate. 
c.  Percent of GDP. 
The use of a labor force measure instead of the total population,  as 
is more common  in similar studies,  makes little  difference  in the ag- 
gregate: over the period  1960-94,  the two series have nearly identical 
growth rates at the level  of the total sample (2. 1 for the labor force and 
2.0  percent for the total population),  and the cross-country  correlation 
of the change is 0.82.  It does makes a difference,  however,  at the level 
of individual countries; and it is important for evaluating the sources of 
growth in some of the East Asian economies  (see the last two columns 
of table 1). The growth of the labor force exceeds  that of the population 
in China and East Asia-with  particularly large differences  in Korea, 
Singapore,  and Taiwan.  Rising labor force participation is also evident 
in the industrial countries,  but the opposite  is true for the low-income, 
high-population  growth economies  of South Asia and sub-Saharan Af- 
rica. Thus using  the labor force  to measure growth in the labor input 
lowers  the amount of  growth attributed to TFP for the faster-growing 
economies  and reduces its variance across countries. 148  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
Human Capital 
Measures  of  the labor force,  in effect,  treat all workers as if  they 
were  identical,  but worker characteristics  clearly  influence  marginal 
productivity.  Some  previous  growth  accounting  studies  of  individual 
countries have incorporated detailed adjustments by labor force group- 
ings,  including  education,  age,  and  gender.24 We  follow  a  simpler 
approach, adjusting only  for the characteristic that has been found to 
be most important: education.  The benefits of education are assumed to 
be embodied  in workers,  as explained  below.25 
Our analysis is based on the educational attainment data constructed 
by Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee.26 They use a combination of data 
sources to infer the percentage of each country's adult population (aged 
twenty-five  and older) that had obtained a particular level  of education 
for each year from 1960 to 1990.27 Census data provide direct measures 
of  a country's  stock  of education  in a particular year.  However,  such 
data are only  available  for selected  years,  particularly in developing 
countries.  Therefore  enrollment  data are used  to  interpolate between 
census  years and,  along  with data on literacy  rates,  to fill in missing 
cells.  The result is  an allocation  of  each country's  population  among 
seven  schooling  levels  (ranging  from no  schooling-illiterate  to  com- 
pleted  postsecondary  schooling)  and an estimate  of  average  years of 
schooling  of the adult population constructed from the categorical data. 
Following  their extrapolation procedures,  we extend the data to  1994. 
Seven of the countries in our sample are not in the Barro-Lee data set.28 
In these cases,  we construct estimates using data on years of schooling 
compiled  by Vikram Nehru,  Eric Swanson,  and Ashutosh Dubey,  and 
the relationship  between  the two data sets for countries at comparable 
stages  of development.29 Although  we believe  that the resulting  indi- 
24.  For example, Denison (1967) and Young (1995). 
25.  Other  formulations  of the production  function  that  treat  the benefits  of education 
separately  from the workers, such as that of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), are 
reported  in Bosworth,  Collins, and Chen (1996). 
26.  Barro  and Lee (1994a). 
27.  Thus we assume  that the educational  distribution  of the population  is represen- 
tative of the educational  distribution  of the labor  force. 
28.  These countries  are China, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Madagascar,  Mo- 
rocco, and Nigeria. 
29.  Nehru, Swanson, and Dubey (1995). This alternative  data  set is based  primarily 
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Table 3.  Educational  Attainment  and Labor  Quality,  by Region and Countrya 
Units as indicated 
Growth rate, 1960-94b 
Average years of schooling  Years of  Quali 
Region and country  1960  1994  schooling  indexc 
China  1.7  5.3  3.5  0.6 
East Asia  2.7  7.2  3.0  0.9 
Indonesia  1.1  5.0  4.5  0.8 
Korea  3.2  9.7  3.3  1.2 
Malaysia  2.3  7.0  3.3  0.8 
Philippines  3.8  7.4  2.0  0.8 
Singapore  3.0  6.1  2.1  0.6 
Thailand  3.5  7.5  2.3  0.7 
Taiwan  3.2  8.2  2.8  1.0 
South Asia  1.3  3.4  2.8  0.5 
Africa  1.6  3.5  2.4  0.3 
Middle East  1.4  4.9  3.8  0.7 
Latin America  3.0  5.5  1.8  0.5 
Industrial countries  7.3  9.8  0.9  0.5 
Source: Authors' calculations as explained in text, based on data sets constructed by Barro and Lee (1994b) and Nehru, 
Swanson, and Dubey (1995). 
a. Computed using the eighty-eight country sample. Regional averages are calculated by weighting each country by its 
average GDP over 1960-94,  as measured in 1985 dollars. 
b. Annual percentage rate. 
c. The labor quality index (H), as described in text, calculated using weights implied by a 7 percent return to each year 
of education. 
cators  represent  the  best  available  comprehensive  educational  data, 
there are a number of potentially  serious  measurement problems,  and 
those  problems  may  vary  systematically  with  the  level  of  develop- 
ment.30 
Table 3 summarizes the average educational attainment for the pop- 
ulations of the East Asian countries and the major regions  worldwide. 
The first column reports average years of schooling  in 1960.  Countries 
in South Asia  had the least educated population,  followed  by those in 
the  Middle  East  and Africa.  On  average,  East  Asian  countries  had 
slightly  less  human capital  (per person) than those  in Latin America, 
cross-country  correlation  between the two measures  of the average level of schooling 
during  the period 1960-85,  the correlation  vanishes in a comparison  of changes over 
the period. There  are also significant  discrepancies  between the two data sets for some 
industrial  countries. As discussed further  in Bosworth, Collins, and Chen (1996), we 
find  the Barro-Lee  data  preferable. 
30.  See Behrman  and  Rosenzweig  (1994) and  Barro  and  Lee (1994a) for discussions 
of the problems  with education  and labor  force data from developing  countries. 150  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
but educational  attainment in both regions  remained  well  below  the 
average for industrial countries.  As  shown  in the second  column,  by 
1994 average educational levels  in East Asia were second only to those 
in industrial countries and well  above levels  in all other nonindustrial 
regions.  Of all the regions,  East Asia experienced  the greatest absolute 
increase  in years of  schooling  between  1960  and  1994.  However,  as 
shown in the third column, East Asia (excluding  China) is not the region 
with the most rapid percentage rate of increase in schooling.  This dis- 
tinction  goes  to the Middle  East,  where educational  levels  nearly tri- 
pled,  but from an initially  low base. 
Prior empirical studies have frequently relied on enrollment rates as 
a proxy for changes  in education.  But the enrollment rate encounters a 
problem similar to that of the investment rate as a measure of physical 
capital accumulation: it only works in (or for linearizations around) the 
steady state.3' The enrollment rate that would be necessary to maintain 
constant average years of schooling  in a country with an initially  high 
stock  would  imply  increasing  years of  schooling  in a country with an 
initially  low  stock.32 Indeed,  enrollment  in  1965  and growth in years 
of schooling  over the period  1965-85  are uncorrelated in the data sets 
of either Barro and Lee or Nehru,  Swanson,  and Dubey. 
More  recently,  several  studies  have  used  the  number of  years  of 
schooling  as an explanatory variable. But, as Barro and Lee are careful 
to point out, the level  of schooling  at the beginning  of a period should 
be  interpreted as  an initial  condition,  not a proxy  for human capital 
accumulation.  Indeed, the initial number of years of schooling  has been 
found to be negatively  correlated with the growth in years of schooling. 
Other studies have used the average years of schooling  over the growth 
period, but this method also fails to measure the accumulation of human 
capital over the period.33 
Many  studies  have  even  found  it  difficult  to  detect  a  significant 
relationship  between  the change  in years of  schooling  and economic 
31.  This assumption,  and its justification  of linearization  around  the steady state, 
became very popular  following the paper  by Mankiw,  Romer, and Weil (1992). 
32.  This point is also made in Benhabib  and Spiegel (1994). 
33.  Benhabib  and Spiegel (1994) justify use of the average  level of schooling with 
an endogenous  growth  model in which productivity  growth  depends  on the accumulated 
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growth.34 Various explanations have been offered.  Some emphasize the 
measurement problems in cross-country data on educational attainment. 
But it is also  evident  that years of  schooling  alone  is a poor index  of 
labor quality because  it assigns  workers with zero education  a weight 
of  zero  and it  implies  disproportionate  changes  in  labor quality  for 
countries with low initial levels  of schooling. 
We have  tried to follow  Edward Denison  and others in using  esti- 
mates of the relative wage structure for workers with different years of 
schooling  to construct weights  for aggregating  workers across educa- 
tional levels.35 Our labor quality index, 
(6)  H  =  I  WjP, 
weights  the percentage of a country's population that has attained level 
j  of  schooling  (Pj,  where j  ranges  from  1:no schooling  to  7:beyond 
secondary completed)  by our estimate of the return to level j of school- 
ing  (Wj). The weights  are based on the observed  relative  earnings  of 
different educational  groups and reflect the assumption that percentage 
returns  to  schooling  are  constant  across  levels  of  schooling  and 
countries. 
A recent article by George Psacharopoulos provides a comprehensive 
survey of the empirical  literature.36 The method most frequently used 
to estimate the return to education  involves  regressing  log earnings on 
years of schooling,  potential years of experience,  potential experience 
squared, and a constant. The estimated coefficient  on years of schooling 
can be interpreted as the average marginal return to an additional year 
of schooling.  The assumption that the returns to schooling  are constant 
across different schooling  levels  is consistent with David Card and Alan 
Krueger's recent findings for the United States.37 However,  Psacharo- 
poulos  reports that the  estimates  for  other  countries  frequently  find 
larger  returns  for  primary  than  for  secondary  or higher  levels  of 
education.38 
34.  Benhabib  and Spiegel (1994), Pritchett  (1995), Harrison  (1996),  and Judson 
(1996). 
35.  See Denison (1967). 
36.  Psacharopoulos  (1994). 
37.  Card  and Krueger  (1996). 
38. The earnings  regression  approach  may overstate  returns  to schooling because it 
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Table 4.  Educational  Attainment  of Adult Population,  by Region and Country,  1960a 
Percent, except as indicated 
Completed  Completed  Completed  Average 
primary  secondary  higher  Region and  No  .return  to 
country  schooling  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  schoolingb 
East Asia  56.6  16.3  17.7  4.2  3.0  0.7  1.4  10.7 
Indonesia  75.5  15.0  7.6  1.4  0.5  0.1  0.0  17.0 
Korea  56.9  3.4  26.2  5.1  5.8  0.7  1.9  10.6 
Malaysia  58.5  21.5  11.2  4.8  2.4  0.2  1.3  9.4 
Philippines  33.5  32.3  17.4  6.1  4.5  2.2  4.0  8.0 
Singapore  64.0  7.9  5.3  15.3  7.6  0.0  0.0  13.4 
Thailand  48.1  12.5  33.9  3.3  1.6  0.0  0.6  10.4 
Taiwan  47.0  24.9  13.9  5.8  4.2  2.1  2.2  6.0 
South Asia  76.7  14.5  5.2  2.1  1.3  0.0  0.1  7.2 
Africa  66.8  11.7  8.5  9.6  3.2  0.1  0.2  13.3 
Middle East  82.3  6.6  4.4  2.6  2.5  0.7  0.8  10.6 
Latin America  41.5  34.7  13.0  5.2  3.6  0.7  1.2  12.3 
Industrial countries  4.4  26.7  30.8  18.1  12.0  3.7  5.2  7.0 
Addendum 
Labor quality weights 
7 percent return  100.0  125.0  150.0  187.0  225.0  262.0  300.0 
12 percent return  100.0  150.0  200.0  300.0  400.0  500.0  600.0 
Source: Data on educational attainment  are from the data sets constructed by Barro  and Lee ( 1994b) and Nehru, Swanson, 
and Dubey  (1995);  and on returns to schooling,  from Psacharopoulos (1994).  Labor quality weights  are the authors' 
calculations,  as described in the text. 
a. Data cover fifty-three of the eighty-eight sample countries. Regional averages are calculated by weighting each country 
by its average GDP over 1960-94,  as measured in 1985 dollars. 
b. The return to each additional year of schooling; see text for details. 
The estimated  average returns to schooling  by region,  drawn from 
data reported by Psacharopoulos,  are summarized in table  4.39  Based 
on the range of regional  estimates,  we construct two indexes  of labor 
quality,  one using  weights  implied  by a 7 percent return to schooling 
(a relatively  low estimate)  and the other using weights  implied by a 12 
percent  return to  schooling  (a relatively  high  estimate).  Both  sets  of 
weights  assign  a value  of  one  hundred to individuals  with  no formal 
schooling.  The weights  implied by the 7 and 12 percent rates of return, 
respectively,  at different levels  of schooling  are shown in table 4.  The 
table  also  shows  the  percentage  distribution  of  the  adult population 
39.  Estimates  are  available  for fifty-three  of the countries  in our  sample  (60 percent), 
including  all of the East Asian countries  and  eighteen  of the twenty-two  Latin  American 
countries.  The average  return  to an additional  year  of school in East  Asia is 10.7 percent, 
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Table 5.  Labor  Quality  Indexes,  by Region and Countrya 
Index, except as indicated 
7 percent returnb  12 percent returnb 
Region and 
Labor quality  Growth 
Labor quality  Growth 
country  1960  1994  ratec  1960  1994  ratec 
China  109.9  135.3  0.6  120.5  183.9  1.3 
East Asia  123.2  166.1  0.9  151.8  252.9  1.5 
Indonesia  109.7  142.8  0.8  119.9  192.4  1.4 
Korea  130.6  197.4  1.2  167.8  331.5  2.0 
Malaysia  121.0  160.0  0.8  145.9  233.8  1.4 
Philippines  139.3  182.8  0.8  188.1  293.4  1.3 
Singapore  127.3  155.2  0.6  162.4  226.4  1.0 
Thailand  126.2  158.2  0.7  154.6  227.9  1.1 
Taiwan  131.1  182.1  1.0  169.5  294.2  1.6 
South Asia  109.9  129.9  0.5  121.2  169.5  1.0 
Africa  114.4  128.3  0.3  130.8  162.4  0.6 
Middle East  111.8  143.0  0.7  126.3  199.5  1.4 
Latin America  127.7  153.8  0.5  160.3  222.6  1.0 
Industrial countries  168.6  200.4  0.5  255.8  338.3  0.8 
Source: Authors' calculations as explained in text. Underlying data on years of schooling are from the data sets constructed 
by Barro and Lee (1994b) and Nehru, Swanson, and Dubey (1995). 
a. Computed using the eighty-eight country sample. Regional averages are calculated by weighting each country by its 
average GDP over 1960-94,  as measured in 1985 dollars. 
b. The return to each additional year of schooling; see text for details. 
c.  Annual percentage rate. 
across each of the seven educational levels in 1960 and 1994, by country 
and region.  The two indexes,  and their rates of growth over the sample 
period,  are summarized  in table 5.  While  growth accounting  decom- 
positions  based on both indexes are presented and compared below,  we 
treat the 7 percent return weights  as our base.40 
The growth rates of the labor quality indexes,  assuming a 7 percent 
return, are reported in the fourth column of table 3.  In contrast to the 
findings of the raw years of schooling  measure (third column),  the labor 
quality measure shows that East Asia experienced  the greatest increase 
in labor quality over the period  1960-94:  a 0.9  percent annual rate of 
40.  There are two reasons for focusing on the decomposition  under a 7 percent 
return.  First, we believe that the likely biases due to omitted  variables  imply overesti- 
mates  of returns  to schooling among  developing  countries.  Second, as discussed  below, 
assuming  a higher  rate  of return  to schooling  will result  in a smaller  residual,  or estimate 
of total factor  productivity,  in East Asia. Since one of our main messages is that there 
is surprisingly  little productivity  growth  for these countries,  we want to ensure  that  this 
conclusion  cannot  be attributed  to extreme  underlying  assumptions. 154  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
growth.  The quality index also sharply changes  the picture of the dis- 
tribution of  education  gains  within  the region.  China and Indonesia, 
which begin  with very low  average years of schooling,  appear to gain 
much  less,  and  Korea jumps  to  the  top  of  the  ranking  in  terms  of 
improvement.  A  similar phenomenon  is evident  in the regional  data, 
where the differences  for growth rates are less notable than for years of 
schooling.  The improvement in labor quality for Africa is much smaller 
than implied  by the increase from an average of one to three years of 
schooling:  a rise  in  labor quality  of  only  0.3  percent  per year.  The 
relative performance of the industrial countries is greatly improved. 
Measures  of Factor  Shares 
The final step in the estimation of the indexes of TFP growth involves 
the choice  of weights  for aggregating  the factor inputs.  As mentioned 
above,  in a competitive  economy  those  weights  could  be represented 
by the shares of income  earned by capital and labor respectively;  and, 
to  be  truly  independent  of  the  underlying  production  function,  the 
weights  would  need  to  vary  freely  across  countries  and time  (as  in 
Divisia-Tornquist  indexes).  However,  reliable  measures  of  factor  in- 
come  shares are not available for most developing  countries,  and even 
for the industrial countries,  problems  arise in dividing  the income  of 
the self-employed  between  the returns to capital and labor. 
We have  employed  fixed  weights  in aggregating  the factor inputs. 
That procedure is consistent with a much more limited set of production 
functions;  but existing  studies  provide  surprisingly  little  evidence  of 
major changes  in factor shares over time.  Instead,  most of the debate 
has been  about the absolute  level  of  the capital  share.  Within the in- 
dustrial countries, the disagreements are largely reconcilable by relating 
them to differences  in the breadth of  the definition  of  capital and the 
specific  sectors  of  the economy  that are included  in the studies.41  For 
definitions  of capital and output close  to ours,  Angus  Maddison  finds 
that capital's  share  of  income  in  the  major  industrial  economies  is 
41.  Denison  (1967), for example, assigns a low weight  to capital  because  he focuses 
on output  net of depreciation  and excludes some of the most capital-intensive  sectors, 
such as housing. In contrast, the studies by Jorgenson  and his various coauthors  use 
gross output  and often include consumer  durables  in capital;  see, for example, Jorgen- 
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clustered around 0.3.42  Steven Englander and Andrew Gurney calculate 
factor  share ratios  (adjusted  for  the  self-employed)  for  the  business 
sector  of  the OECD  countries,  finding that capital's  share varies  be- 
tween 0.3  and 0.4  and is largely free of trend.43 
For  the  developing  economies,  there  has  typically  been  a  much 
broader range  of  variation.  Where  national  accounts  data exist,  the 
reported capital  shares are usually  well  above  those  of  the industrial 
countries,  but the difference  is heavily  influenced by the large role of 
the  self-employed,  whose  income  is  included  with  that of  capital.44 
Furthermore, it could be a mistake to attribute the higher share to the 
greater importance of capital in these economies.  For example,  capital's 
contribution could be overstated if developing  countries systematically 
suffer from weaker competition  and a greater role for monopoly profits. 
Parametric estimates,  however,  have  also  generally  found that the 
capital elasticity  is higher in developing  economies.  For example,  Kim 
and Lau obtain capital elasticities  in excess  of 0.4  for the Asian newly 
industrializing  countries,  compared with values near 0.3  for the indus- 
trial countries;  and Ann Harrison obtains coefficients  in excess  of 0.4 
for a larger set of developing  economies.45 Yet there are good reasons 
for believing  that the parametric estimates  will  be biased upward.46 
We believe,  from the existing  literature, that a plausible  range for 
the capital share is 0.3  to 0.4;  and there is also considerable  evidence 
that the  capital  elasticity  is  higher  in developing  economies  than in 
industrial economies.  However,  to minimize  concern  about methodo- 
logical  differences  in our comparison of growth in East Asia with that 
in other regions,  we use a uniform capital share of 0.35  for the entire 
sample.  We also treat the benefits of education (H) as being embodied 
in workers,  so that the basic production relationship is of the form 
(7)  Q  =  AKOWLY"', 
42.  Maddison  (1987, p. 659). 
43.  Englander  and Gurney  (1994) use the average factor share in each country  to 
construct  TFP indexes. 
44.  For four Asian economies, Young (1995) estimates the factor shares with de- 
tailed adjustments  for the self-employed. For various  periods  during  the last three dec- 
ades, he obtains  a capital  share  of 0.32 for Korea,  0.29 for Taiwan,  0.53 for Singapore, 
and 0.37 for Hong Kong. The share appears  to be constant  over time for Taiwan and 
Singapore,  to fall slightly for Korea, and to rise for Hong Kong. 
45.  Kim and Lau (1994); Harrison  (1996). See, as well, Page (1994). 
46.  Some evidence is provided  in Benhabib  and Spiegel (1994, pp. 169-73). 156  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
where cx =  0.35.  Thus we report our results in a form that decomposes 
the  growth  of  output  per  worker  (qll)  into  the  contributions  of  the 
growth of physical capital per worker (kll),  the growth of education per 
worker (h),  and the growth of total factor productivity (a): 
(8)  qll  =  o(k/l)  +  (1  -  o)  h  +  a. 
Sources of East Asian Growth 
The growth in output per worker,  divided  into the contributions  of 
increases  in physical  capital  per worker,  education  per worker,  and 
total factor productivity,  is reported in table 6 for the seven East Asian 
economies  over various subperiods of  1960-94.  For comparative pur- 
poses,  regional  aggregates  are reported in table 7.  We separate China 
from the rest of  Asia  both because  of  its  size  and because  there are 
questions  about the accuracy of the underlying national accounts data. 
The United States is also reported separately because  of the interest in 
comparing  East Asia  today  with the other industrial countries  during 
the  periods  when  they  were  rapidly  catching  up  to  the  productivity 
standards of  the United  States.  An alternative,  graphic perspective  is 
provided by the summary of the regional indexes  on an annual basis in 
figure 2-again,  growth in output per worker is divided  into the con- 
tribution of increased capital per worker and TFP.47 
The results are interesting  in several respects.  First,  as stressed by 
Young,  it is quite surprising to note the extent to which the extraordi- 
nary growth of East Asia has been driven by factor accumulation,  while 
gains in TFP have been rather modest.48 In fact,  the division  between 
factor accumulation  and TFP growth is actually tilted more toward the 
former by extension  of  the analysis  to cover  a larger number of  East 
Asian  countries.  While  it might be tempting to argue that developing 
economies  can make rapid strides forward simply  by accelerating  the 
pace at which they adopt the more efficient technologies  of the industrial 
countries,  this does  not appear to be an important aspect of the Asian 
success  story. The estimated growth of TFP for the region,  1. 1 percent 
47.  Capital  per worker  is defined  such that  capital  includes  education. 
48.  See Young (1994, 1995). Our  results  for Korea,  Singapore,  and  Taiwan  are  very 
similar  to those of Young, allowing for our inclusion  of the agricultural  sector. Susan M. Collins and Barry P. Bosworth  157 
Table  6. Sources of Growth  in East Asia, by Country  and Period 
Percentage points per year 
Growth of 
Contribution by component 
Country and  output per  Physical capital  Education  Total factor 
period  worker  peri workera  per workerb  productivityc 
Indonesia 
1960-94  3.4  2.1  0.5  0.8 
1960-73  2.5  0.9  0.5  1.1 
1973-94  4.0  2.8  0.5  0.7 
1973-84  4.3  3.3  0.5  0.5 
1984-94  3.7  2.3  0.5  0.9 
Korea 
1960-94  5.7  3.3  0.8  1.5 
1960-73  5.6  3.2  0.9  1.4 
1973-94  5.8  3.4  0.7  1.6 
1973-84  5.3  3.4  0.8  1.1 
1984-94  6.2  3.3  0.6  2.1 
Malaysia 
1960-94  3.8  2.3  0.5  0.9 
1960-73  4.0  2.4  0.5  1.0 
1973-94  3.7  2.3  0.5  0.9 
1973-84  3.6  2.7  0.5  0.4 
1984-94  3.8  1.8  0.5  1.4 
Philippines 
1960-94  1.3  1.2  0.5  -  0.4 
1960-73  2.5  1.3  0.6  0.7 
1973-94  0.5  1.1  0.5  -  1.1 
1973-84  1.2  2.0  0.6  -  1.3 
1984-94  -  0.3  0.2  0.4  -  0.9 
Singapore 
1960-94  5.4  3.4  0.4  1.5 
1960-73  5.9  4.6  0.4  0.9 
1973-94  5.1  2.7  0.4  2.0 
1973-84  4.3  3.1  0.2  1.0 
1984-94  6.0  2.3  0.6  3.1 
Thailand 
1960-94  5.0  2.7  0.4  1.8 
1960-73  4.8  3.2  0.1  1.4 
1973-94  5.2  2.3  0.6  2.1 
1973-84  3.6  2.0  0.5  1.1 
1984-94  6.9  2.6  0.8  3.3 
Taiwan 
1960-94  5.8  3.1  0.6  2.0 
1960-73  6.8  3.9  0.5  2.2 
1973-94  5.2  2.7  0.7  1.8 
1973-84  4.9  3.0  0.9  0.9 
1984-94  5.6  2.3  0.5  2.8 
Source: Authors' calculations, as explained in text, based on data from World Data 1995; the data sets of Barro and Lee 
(1994b),  Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993),  and Nehru, Swanson, and Dubey (1995); the Penn-World Tables, mark 5.6; and 
unpublished materials provided by the International Labour Organisation. 
a. The contribution of physical capital per worker is its growth rate multiplied by capital's production share (ot =  0.35). 
b. The contribution of education per worker is the growth rate of  the labor quality itidex (H) multiplied by labor's 
production share (I  -  ot =  0.65). 
c. The contribution of TFP is the difference between the growth rate of output per worker and the summed contributions 
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Table 7. Sources  of Growth,  by Region  and Perioda 
Percentage points per year 
Growth of  Contribution by component 
output per  Physical capital  Education  Total factor 
Region and period  worker  per workerb  per workerc  productivityd 
China 
1960-94  4.5  1.5  0.4  2.6 
1960-73  2.2  0.4  0.4  1.4 
1973-94  6.0  2.2  0.4  3.3 
1973-84  4.3  1.7  0.4  2.2 
1984-94  8.0  2.9  0.3  4.6 
East Asia 
1960-94  4.2  2.5  0.6  1.1 
1960-73  4.2  2.3  0.5  1.3 
1973-94  4.2  2.5  0.6  1.0 
1973-84  4.0  2.8  0.6  0.5 
1984-94  4.4  2.2  0.6  1.6 
South Asia 
1960-94  2.3  1.1  0.3  0.8 
1960-73  1.8  1.4  0.3  0.1 
1973-94  2.6  0.9  0.3  1.3 
1973-84  2.5  0.9  0.4  1.2 
1984-94  2.7  1.0  0.3  1.5 
Africa 
1960-94  0.3  0.8  0.2  -0.6 
1960-73  1.9  1.3  0.2  0.3 
1973-94  -0.6  0.4  0.2  - 1.3 
1973-84  -0.6  1.2  0.2  -  2.0 
1984-94  -0.6  -0.4  0.3  -0.4 
(continued) 
Source: See table 6. 
a. Computed using the eighty-eight country sample. Regional averages are calculated by weighting each country by its 
average GDP over 1960-94,  as measured in 1985 dollars. 
b. The contribution of physical capital per worker is its growth rate multiplied by capital's production share (ot =  0.35). 
per year over the thirty-four-year period,  is about the same as that of 
the industrial countries other than the United States,  and only margin- 
ally above that of South Asia.  Gains in TFP account for only one-fourth 
of the region's  growth in output per worker over the past three decades. 
The  situation  may  be  changing,  as  there  is  some  evidence  of  more 
extensive  gains  in  TFP in the period  1984-94.  There are also  some 
important differences  among individual countries: TFP growth is higher 
for Taiwan,  and the performance of the Philippines  is strikingly poor. 
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Table 7. Sources  of Growth,  by Region and Perioda (continued) 
Percentage points per year 
Growth of  Contribution by component 
output per  Physical  capital  Education  Total factor 
Region and period  worker  per workerb  per workerc  productivityd 
Middle East 
1960-94  1.6  1.5  0.5  -0.3 
1960-73  4.7  2.0  0.4  2.3 
1973-94  -0.3  1.1  0.5  -  1.9 
1973-84  0.5  2.2  0.6  -  2.2 
1984-94  -  1.1  -0.0  0.5  -  1.5 
Latin America 
1960-94  1.5  0.9  0.4  0.2 
1960-73  3.4  1.3  0.3  1.8 
1973-94  0.3  0.6  0.4  -0.8 
1973-84  0.4  1.1  0.4  -  1.1 
1984-94  0.1  0.1  0.4  -0.4 
United States 
1960-94  1.1  0.4  0.4  0.3 
1960-73  1.9  0.5  0.6  0.8 
1973-94  0.6  0.3  0.2  0.1 
1973-84  0.2  0.3  0.5  -0.5 
1984-94  0.9  0.3  -0.0  0.7 
Other industrial countries 
1960-94  2.9  1.5  0.4  1.1 
1960-73  4.8  2.3  0.4  2.2 
1973-94  1.7  1.0  0.4  0.4 
1973-84  1.8  1.1  0.6  0.2 
1984-94  1.7  0.8  0.2  0.7 
c.  The contribution of  education per worker is the growth rate of  the labor quality index (H)  multiplied by labor's 
production share (I  -  ot =  0.65). 
d. The contribution of TFP is the difference between the growth rate of output per worker and the summed contributions 
of physical capital per worker and education per worker. 
in an absolute sense, it is far better than that achieved by some other 
developing regions. It has been negative in Africa and the Middle East 
and nearly zero in Latin  America. The real surprise  is that TFP growth 
is low in all of the developing countries. We would have expected that 
the ability to borrow existing technology and management  expertise 
from  the advanced  industrial  nations  would make  the process easier for 
those who came after. That does not appear  to be true. 
Second, the contribution  of educational  advances,  if adequately  mea- 
sured  by wage differentials,  is larger  in East Asia than  in other  regions, 
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Figure  2. Output per Worker  and Its Components,  by Region, 1960-94a 
Index,  1960  = 1 
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Source: See table 6. 
a. The level of capital per worker is an indexed sum of the two components of capital: physical capital per worker and 
education  per worker.  These components  are weighted by the production  shares  of physical capital and labor,  respectively. Susan M. Collins and Barry P. Bosworth  161 
largest for Korea and Taiwan, but the intraregional  variation  is small. 
If there are large spillover effects, taking account of education  raises 
additional  questions about  the modest growth  of TFP because the spill- 
overs would be reflected  in larger  TFP gains for countries  with major 
improvements  in education, such as those in East Asia. 
Furthermore,  East  Asia stands  out in the extent  to which the countries 
of the region have avoided the large reversals  of TFP growth  that have 
been common elsewhere, such as in Latin  America  in the 1980s and in 
the Middle East since the mid-1970s. This is particularly  evident for 
the late 1970s and  early 1980s, when the global oil and  financial  shocks 
and war proved so costly to other regions. In contrast, figure 2 shows 
that  the major  East  Asian countries  righted  their  economies and  resumed 
growth more quickly than those in other regions. 
In addition, there does seem to be some basis for questioning the 
magnitude  of growth reported  for China in the 1980s because the gain 
in TFP is so large and is out of line with that experienced  by the other 
East Asian economies at similar stages of their development. Only in 
China does the contribution  of TFP growth exceed that of capital per 
worker. In their latest update  of the Penn-World  Tables, Robert  Sum- 
mers and Alan Heston argue  that the official estimates  of China's GDP 
understate  the level of output and overstate its growth.49  Their basic 
point, that inflation  is underestimated  and thus growth overestimated, 
is supported  by a recent study concluding that output growth in the 
industrial  sector has been overstated.50  In addition, it is consistent  with 
the puzzling depreciation  in the reported  Chinese real exchange rate, 
which today is at about one-third  of its 1980 level. Real depreciation 
might  be expected as part  of the process of economic liberalization,  but 
the magnitude  and sustained  nature  of the decline is unexpected. Gen- 
erally, real exchange rates rise with development. In China's case, the 
decline in the exchange rate has been large enough to eliminate any 
evidence of real growth in the dollar-denominated  measure of GDP. 
One  explanation  for such  a result  is that  the official  statistics  underestimate 
the inflation  rate,  overstating  real  growth.  The growth  of the Chinese  real 
GDP  in the PWT  is about  the same  as that  reported  in the official  data  for 
the period 1960-80, but for 1980-92 the PWT growth  rate  is 5 percent, 
as compared  with the 9 percent  official  rate  that  we use. 
49.  Summers  and Heston (1994). 
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Of the other  regions, South  Asia seems to have enjoyed  considerably 
improved  productivity  performance  in the 1980s, after  a decade of very 
weak performance.  A larger  portion  of the growth  of these economies 
has been the result of improvements  in TFP than is true for East Asia. 
Africa stands out for very poor performance:  output per worker has 
increased  by an annual  average of only 0.3 percent  over the past three 
decades, and TFP growth  has been highly negative. Finally, the 1980s 
may have been a lost decade for Latin  America  from the perspective  of 
growth  in output  per worker,  but there is an even longer history of low 
rates  of growth  in the TFP  component.  In fact, it is interesting  that  after 
the 1973 oil crisis, all of the regions of the world except Asia experi- 
enced a sharp  slowing of growth from which they have yet to recover. 
We recompute  the accounts using alternative  values of 0.3 and 0.4 
for the capital  share.  Those results, under  both  the base case assumption 
of a 7 percent  return  to education  and the alternative  12 percent  return, 
are summarized  in table 8. As a region, East Asia exhibits the greatest 
sensitivity to the choice of the parameter  values because it accumulates 
both physical capital and education faster than do other regions. An 
increase in the weight attached to physical capital accumulation  in- 
creases capital's contribution  and reduces the residual  contribution  of 
TFP by 0.6  percentage  points per year over the period 1960-94.  An 
increase in the assumed  return  to education  from 7 to 12 percent  would 
further  reduce  the contribution  of TFP  by 0.4 percentage  point. Overall, 
the contribution  of TFP could range from a high of  1.4 percentage 
points per year to a low of 0.4.  We interpret  this result to imply that it 
would take even more  extreme  values  to change  the fundamental  conclu- 
sion that  growth  in East  Asia is dominated  by factor  accumulation. 
Productivity Growth versus Capital Accumulation 
It is clear that the Asian economies are different in terms of their 
overall output  growth, but there is considerably  less agreement  about 
why this is so. Although their success has generated  a vast empirical 
literature  directed toward explaining the source of their growth, that 
research has not eliminated the controversy. In part, the continued 
debate results from the difficulties of using cross-national  analysis to 
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Table 8.  Sources  of Growth  under  Alternative  Assumptions  of Capital  Share  and 
Returns  to Education,  by Region,  1960-94a 
Percentage points, except as indicated 
Region and assumption 
Region and  Capital's  Growth of  Contribution by component 
return to  production  output per  Physical  capital  Education  Total factor 
educationb  sharec  worker  per workerd  per workere  productivity' 
China 
7 percent  0.3  4.5  1.3  0.4  2.7 
0.4  4.5  1.8  0.4  2.4 
12 percent  0.3  4.5  1.3  0.9  2.3 
0.4  4.5  1.8  0.7  2.0 
East Asia 
7 percent  0.3  4.2  2.1  0.6  1.4 
0.4  4.2  2.8  0.5  0.8 
12 percent  0.3  4.2  2.1  1.0  1.0 
0.4  4.2  2.8  0.9  0.4 
South Asia 
7 percent  0.3  2.3  1.0  0.3  1.0 
0.4  2.3  1.3  0.3  0.7 
12 percent  0.3  2.3  1.0  0.7  0.6 
0.4  2.3  1.3  0.6  0.4 
Africa 
7 percent  0.3  0.3  0.7  0.2  -  0.6 
0.4  0.3  0.9  0.2  -  0.7 
12 percent  0.3  0.3  0.7  0.5  -0.8 
0.4  0.3  0.9  0.4  -0.9 
Middle East 
7 percent  0.3  1.6  1.2  0.5  -0.1 
0.4  1.6  1.7  0.4  -  0.5 
12 percent  0.3  1.6  1.2  1.0  -0.6 
0.4  1.6  1.7  0.8  -  0.9 
Latin America 
7 percent  0.3  1.5  0.8  0.4  0.3 
0.4  1.5  1.0  0.3  0.1 
12 percent  0.3  1.5  0.8  0.7  0.0 
0.4  1.5  1.0  0.6  -  0.1 
Industrial countries 
7 percent  0.3  2.3  1.0  0.4  1.0 
0.4  2.3  1.3  0.3  0.7 
12 percent  0.3  2.3  1.0  0.6  0.7 
0.4  2.3  1.3  0.5  0.5 
Source: See table 6. 
a. Computed using the eighty-eight country sample. Regional averages are calculated by weighting each country by its 
average GDP over 1960-94,  as measured in 1985 dollars. 
b. The return  to each additional year of schooling; see text for details. 
c.  Presented as a decimal. 
d. The contribution of physical capital per worker is its growth rate multiplied by capital's production share (cr). 
e.  The contribution of education per worker is the growth rate of  the labor quality index (H)  multiplied by labor's 
production share (I  -  o). 
f. The contribution of TFP is the difference between the growth rate of output per worker and the summed contributions 
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policy measures. The regression  analysis, in particular,  has been frus- 
trated  by the instability  of results  in the face of seemingly  minor  changes 
in specification.51  In addition, growth and its proximate  determinants 
are all endogenous elements, making  it hard  to infer causality. 
Similar  questions  could be raised  about  our  decomposition  of growth 
in output  per worker  into capital  accumulation  and  TFP  growth. Distin- 
guishing between the two could be difficult for at least two reasons. 
First, technical advances might be embodied in new capital. Second, 
by raising the returns  to capital, increased TFP might induce greater 
capital accumulation.  Thus, as a point of departure,  it is worth asking 
whether the growth accounting exercise actually yields a meaningful 
decomposition  and whether  it allows one to say anything  more definite 
about the ways in which the East Asian countries  differ from others. 
As one approach  to these issues, we use regression  analysis to relate 
economic growth to some basic measures  of initial conditions and the 
external environment. We then attempt to determine the extent to 
which, conditional  on these basic determinants,  the East Asian growth 
experience differs from that of other economic regions. The same ex- 
ercise is then performed  on the two components, factor accumulation 
and TFP growth. 
In developing the indicators  of initial and external conditions, we 
have borrowed  heavily from prior work by Barro and Lee.52  We are 
able to replicate  the essential features  of their statistical  results for our 
different  sample  of countries  and somewhat  different  measure  of output 
per worker. Our basic indicators  are presented  in table 9. The initial 
level of income per  capita  (in international  prices)  is included  to capture 
the phenomenon  of catchup,  and  life expectancy  and  years  of schooling 
are included as measures  of health and education, respectively. Varia- 
tions in the external environment are represented  by the mean and 
standard  deviation  of the annual  change  in each country's  terms  of trade 
51.  Levine and Renelt (1992). 
52.  Barro  and Lee (1994b). Since we do not find any role in our data set for the 
Barro-Lee  measure  of revolutions  and political instability, it is excluded from the fol- 
lowing analysis. Nor do we attempt  to differentiate  between  the roles  of male and  female 
education levels. The most important  difference in our analysis is that we adjust for 
changes  in labor  force participation  by using GDP per worker  as the dependent  variable; 
Barro  and Lee used per capita  GDP. In addition,  the initial income level is measured  as 
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Table 9.  Initial  Conditions  and External  Shocks,  by Region  and Countrya 
Units as indicated 
Standard 
Change  deviation 
Region and  Income  Life  Years of  in terms  of terms  Investment 
country  per capitab  expectancyc  schoolingd  of tradee  of tradeI  shareg 
China  5.4  36.3  2.1  -0.4  5.0  20.5 
East Asia  11.4  55.0  3.3  -0.0  11.2  21.6 
Indonesia  5.8  41.5  1.6  5.4  25.6  17.1 
Korea  8.7  54.2  4.4  -1.5  5.9  23.7 
Malaysia  15.0  54.3  2.8  -1.2  9.9  23.5 
Philippines  11.5  53.1  4.2  -1.7  10.5  15.3 
Singapore  16.6  63.7  3.2  1.6  5.7  31.2 
Thailand  9.6  52.7  3.2  -2.5  8.1  18.1 
Taiwan  12.3  65.4  3.8  0.0  12.8  22.0 
South Asia  7.8  47.7  1.7  -1.2  10.4  9.3 
Africa  9.2  42.1  1.2  -1.3  16.4  8.8 
Middle East  15.7  54.5  2.6  1.7  14.3  17.2 
Latin America  22.1  55.4  3.2  -0.9  15.4  15.6 
Industrial countries  55.6  69.3  6.4  -1.2  8.0  25.9 
Total  25.3  55.1  3.4  -0.7  12.9  17.0 
Source: Per capita income and investment share are authors' calculations based on international  price data from the Penn- 
World Tables, mark 5.6.  Data on life expectancy are from the data set constructed by Barro and Lee ( 1994b); and for years 
of schooling,  from the data sets constructed by Barro and Lee (1994a) and Nehru. Swanson, and Dubey (1995).  Terms of 
trade are the authors' calculations based on data from World  Data  1995. 
a. Computed for the eighty-eight country sample. Regional averages are simple averages. 
b. Percent of U.S.  level,  1960. 
c.  Years,  1960. 
d. Average for the adult population,  1965. 
e.  Mean of annual log changes ( x  100),  1965-92. 
f. Standard  deviation of annual log changes ( x  100),  1965-92. 
g. Average percent of GDP,  1960-94. 
(defined  as the ratio of the price index of exports to the price index of 
imports, both measured  in dollars). 
The results of our regression analysis are presented  in table 10. As 
shown  in column 1, these conditioning  variables  account  for nearly  half 
of the cross-national  variation  in per capita GDP growth  for the period 
1960-94.  Except for the catchup measure (initial income), they do 
relatively little to explain why the East Asian economies have grown 
faster  than  the average:  the means  of the conditioning  variables  for East 
Asia, shown in table 9, do not differ significantly from those of the 
total sample. They do, however, highlight some important  differences 
between East Asia and other individual regions. Comparison  of East 
Asia and Latin America shows that about one-fourth of the gap in 
growth  rates  can be attributed  to differing  magnitudes  of terms-of-trade 00 
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shocks. By contrast,  differing external  conditions explain little of East 
Asia's rapid growth relative to South Asia. The higher education and 
life expectancy  in East Asia, however, are  worth  about  0.75 percentage 
point per year of higher growth. 
The results of adding fixed regional effects are reported  in column 
2. Relative to the base region, East Asia, the others  have considerably 
lower growth  rates. The difference  is small for the industrial  countries, 
but it is large (over 2 percentage  points per year) for Latin  America  and 
sub-Saharan  Africa. The regional effects also reduce the significance 
of education and the terms of trade, while raising the overall adjusted 
R2 to 0.62. 
The contribution  of capital accumulation  is included  as a right-hand- 
side variable in column 3. Recognizing that it is likely to be highly 
endogenous, we interpret the regression as indicating whether the 
growth accounting  has resulted  in a meaningful  measure  of the contri- 
bution of capital accumulation.  It is reassuring  to note that the coeffi- 
cient on the capital  accumulation  term  is not significantly  different  from 
unity and that it raises the adjusted  R2 to 0.70.53 Column  4 reports  the 
result of substituting  the investment rate for the capital accumulation 
term. The use of the investment share as a proxy for capital accumu- 
lation results in a much  lower overall adjusted  R2, 0.46, leaving a much 
larger residual estimate of the contribution  of productivity gains to 
economic growth.54 
The remaining  columns of table 10 report  the results from parallel 
regressions for the contributions of capital accumulation and TFP 
growth. Here it is interesting  to note that while the set of conditioning 
variables  explains a significant  portion  of the variation  in both capital 
accumulation  and TFP growth, the regional effects are very large and 
significant  for capital accumulation  but marginal  for TFP growth. The 
addition  of the regional  dummy  variables  raises the adjusted  R2  by 0.28 
for capital accumulation  but by only 0.07 for TFP growth. Because the 
regional effects are measured  relative to East Asia, the implication is 
that East Asia stands  out from the other  regions in the magnitude  of its 
53.  Combining  the capital  accumulation  term  with fixed regional  effects results  in a 
coefficient of 0.95,  and only the regional measure  for Latin America  retains  statistical 
significance. 
54.  This regression  is based  on the investment  share  as given in international  prices. 
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capital accumulation,  but not for TFP growth. Furthermore,  as shown 
in regression  equation  9, the measure  of capital accumulation  is essen- 
tially orthogonal  to the estimate of TFP growth. 
These same issues of the relative importance  of TFP and capital 
formation appear in a slightly different context as part of  the new 
endogenous growth theory literature.  In many such models, TFP and 
capital per worker are expected to be highly correlated, both across 
countries  and over time. Thus the conclusion from our regression  anal- 
ysis-that,  controlling  for differences in initial conditions and the ex- 
ternal environment, growth in TFP is  largely orthogonal to that of 
capital per worker-is  surprising. 
It is important  to note that the correlation  between TFP growth and 
factor accumulation  is sensitive to the choice of the capital elasticity. 
Assuming a higher capital share tends to reduce the residual measure 
of TFP growth and, consequently, to lower the correlation  between 
productivity  and accumulation.  Our assumption  of 0.35 is a relatively 
low estimate for the nonindustrial  economies, however. Thus, if any- 
thing, we would expect the correlation  to be overstated  in our data. 
The issue of correlation  is explored more fully in figure 3. Looking 
first at the industrial  countries, the upper panels distinguish between 
the experience of  1960-73,  when many of these countries had high 
rates of investment  and were actively engaged in catching up with the 
technological leader (the United States), and the period of a common 
slowdown in growth  after 1973. We expect to find  a positive correlation 
between TFP growth and capital accumulation;  previous studies have 
reported  high correlations, both over long periods and in recent dec- 
ades.55  Indeed, that is exactly what emerges in our data for the period 
before 1973. However, the correlation  is modest: an adjusted  R2 of 
0.38.  In contrast, the upper right-hand  panel shows no evidence of a 
relationship after 1973. Some reduction of the correlation might be 
expected as marginal  returns  on investments  are equalized and the gap 
between  the leader  and its followers is reduced.  Those projects  with the 
largest advances in technology presumably  have high relative returns 
and would be among the first to be undertaken  in all cases. Thus TFP 
growth  would not be reflected  in variations  of investment  at the margin. 
Still, the disappearance  of the relationship  is quite surprising. 
55.  See, for example, Baumol, Nelson, and  Wolff (1994), and  Grossman  and Help- 
man  (1994). 0  4- 
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The story for the nonindustrial  economies is essentially the opposite 
of that for the industrial  economies. Before 1973, there appears  to be 
no correlation  between TFP growth and capital accumulation  (lower 
left-hand panel). Again, it is evident that while the East Asian econ- 
omies exhibit  relatively  rapid  capital  accumulation,  they are  not unusual 
in terms of productivity.  After 1973 a modest correlation  emerges, but 
largely as the result of developments  outside of East Asia: capital ac- 
cumulation declines and TFP collapses. Meanwhile, the East Asian 
countries  continue to accumulate  capital rapidly  and to maintain  mod- 
erate rates of productivity  growth. 
These results offer striking  support  to Young's argument,  discussed 
in the introduction.  The East Asian economies are  unusual  primarily  in 
regard  to capital accumulation,  not TFP growth. The regional coeffi- 
cients are highly negative and significant  for overall growth  and  capital 
accumulation, but they are small and largely insignificant for TFP 
growth. This outcome is not very encouraging  either for the argument 
that the East Asian experience reflects the benefits of open, liberalized 
markets, or for the view that it illustrates the efficiency gains of an 
activist governmental  industrial  policy. Most of these policies are ex- 
pected to operate  by affecting the level and growth  of TFP, but there  is 
little about the behavior  of TFP in East Asia to be explained. Instead, 
it appears that the East Asian economies do well because they are 
willing to make the sacrifices necessary to accumulate  capital at very 
high rates. 
The Role of Government 
The role of government  has emerged  as the most controversial  aspect 
of the East Asian growth  experience. The debate is not about  whether 
policy mattered, but over which measures paid off and their relative 
importance.  Although we cannot hope to resolve these issues, we be- 
lieve that inadequate  attention  has been devoted to assessing the chan- 
nels through which policy  operated and that the growth accounts 
provide  a basis for distinguishing  the effect of policies on factor accu- 
mulation  from improvements  in the efficiency with which the factors 
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such policies  "worked"  by generating large gains in productivity 
should be viewed with suspicion. 
Government  is often cited as a major  actor  in the turnaround  of East 
Asia-a  region whose economic prospects  seemed dismal in the early 
1960s. Growth  was slow. Most countries  had very low rates of saving 
and investment;  some were heavily dependent  on foreign aid. At the 
time, external  assessments  of East Asia's prospects  were typically very 
pessimistic, relative  to those for Latin  America  and  Africa. Indeed, one 
World  Bank study considered  the Philippines  the country  most likely to 
succeed.56  Since the early 1960s, each of the currently  high-performing 
East Asian countries  has initiated  significant  policy changes, although 
there has been considerable  variation  both in the timing and in many 
features  of the policies implemented,  as discussed  further  below. While 
many  of these economies  experienced  difficulties  along  the way, the rap- 
idity and  persistence  of their  subsequent  growth  has been phenomenal. 
The policy measures  that  have been suggested  as contributing  to East 
Asia's  success can be divided into two groups. The first comprises 
policies that are now generally agreed  to have played a positive role in 
both capital accumulation  and productivity  gains. These include stable 
macroeconomic  policy (albeit defined  in somewhat  different  ways) and 
the promotion  of education.  The policies in the second group  have been 
more controversial.  Trade  policy (more specifically, openness or out- 
ward orientation) is often cited as a central element of the region's 
success; however, definitions  of openness vary widely, as do the views 
on its importance.  Most controversial  are  the different  types of selective 
intervention  that have been pursued  to varying degrees over the years 
by governments  in the region. Since export promotion  was often one 
of the objectives of intervention,  there  is some overlap  between  policies 
of intervention  and outward  orientation.57 
56.  World  Bank (1993b, p. 14). 
57.  There is a very large literature  assessing the role of policy in rapid  East Asian 
growth.  Recent  studies  that  emphasize  the importance  of market  friendly  policies include 
World Bank (1993a) and Krueger  (1995). Studies that stress the effects of selective 
intervention  include Amsden (1994) and Fishlow and others (1994). Views about the 
importance  of outward  orientation  range  from  Sachs and  Warner  (1995), who argue  that 
it is the most important  element of government  policy, to Rodrik  (1994,  1995), who 
argues  that  export  orientation  could not have played a significant  role. Easterly  (1995) 
and  Easterly  and  others  (1993) argue  that  good luck may have been more  important  than 
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It is striking  that the controversy  focuses on the role of policies that 
are presumed  to operate  by promoting  growth in TFP. As one analyst 
remarks,  "Central  to  the debate  .  .  .  is  industrial policy,  defined  as 
government  efforts  to alter  industrial  structures  to promote  productivity- 
based growth."58  Our  decomposition  clearly implies that  this debate  is 
misplaced. The search  for lessons from  high Asian growth  should  focus 
on the magnitude  and persistence  of capital accumulation,  not on pro- 
ductivity gains. Indeed, if outward  orientation  and selective interven- 
tion do work, it may well be through  their  effects on rates  of investment 
and saving. 
It is also striking  that the same group of successful economies has 
been used to illustrate  the purported  benefits of extremely different- 
and  conflicting-policy  strategies.  Those  Western  economists  who tend 
to stress the benefits of free markets  frequently  cite East Asia as evi- 
dence that a relatively laissez-faire approach  pays off.  According to 
this view, these economies prospered  due to the establishment  of rela- 
tively open trading  regimes and other market  friendly policy reforms. 
By contrast, Asian economists and policymakers are more likely to 
describe  their  underlying  policy strategy  as sequential  industrial  target- 
ing, based on the Japanese  model initiated  in the 1950s.9 Yet neither 
they nor most Western  economists would classify Japanese  policy dur- 
ing 1950-70 as an example of a market  friendly approach. 
For a variety of reasons, it is difficult  to draw  definitive  conclusions 
about  which policies worked  and why. Policies are often implemented 
together  as a group, confounding  efforts  to tease out the separate  effects 
of the individual  measures.  Cross-country  (or panel) regression  studies 
require  simple indicators  of policy that typically capture  actual differ- 
ences poorly and suffer from measurement  error. Arguably, the avail- 
able measures of trade regime and industrial  targeting-the  areas of 
most controversy-are  even more problematic  than  measures  of fiscal, 
monetary,  and  exchange  rate  policy. The fact that  most policy variables 
should  be considered  endogenous  makes causal interpretations  of these 
regressions suspect. On the other hand, while case study approaches 
can yield much  clearer  pictures  of what  happened  in individual  (or small 
groups of) countries, they typically do not have adequate  checks on 
58.  Kwon (1994, p. 635). 
59.  See, for example, Ito (1992, 1994) and Singh (1994). 174  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
their conclusions, since they provide limited comparison  with perfor- 
mance in other  countries  that have pursued  similar  policies. However, 
it is interesting  to note that the detailed studies highlight disparities 
among  policies followed by the high-growth  East Asian countries. We 
focus below on the roles of macroeconomic  policies and  trade  policies.60 
The remainder  of this section provides some background  information 
about the initial situation, policy, and performance  in East Asia, and 
then turns to an empirical analysis of the links between policy and 
economic growth. 
East Asian Policy:  An Overview 
As a starting point, it is important  to recognize that East Asia is 
composed  of very diverse  countries;  only a Westerner  would lump  them 
together!  The population  data  in table 1 show the considerable  range  in 
size from a tiny city state (Singapore)  to small countries  (Malaysia  and 
Taiwan), moderate sized countries (Korea, Thailand, and the Philip- 
pines), and the relatively populous Indonesia. While some countries, 
such as Korea, are relatively poor in resources, others, such as Indo- 
nesia, are richly endowed and face the special problems  of commodity 
booms and  busts. The fact that  Indonesia  comprises  thousands  of islands 
raises another set of unique issues. Furthermore,  Korea is ethnically 
quite homogeneous, but the same cannot  be said of Malaysia. 
Before the onset of rapid growth, there was considerable intra- 
regional variation  in economic and social conditions. The seven coun- 
tries were at very different  developmental  stages. Indonesia  and Thai- 
land began  their  growth  periods  with very high percentages  of the labor 
force in agriculture  (62 percent  and  75 percent, respectively). In 1965, 
Korea and Taiwan had relatively high initial levels of education, but 
average years of schooling were only 1.6 in Indonesia  and 2.8 in Ma- 
laysia (see table 9). Per  capita  incomes in Singapore  and  Malaysia  were 
substantially  higher than those in Korea, Thailand, and especially In- 
donesia (see table 1). The region's income distribution  is typically 
characterized  as relatively equitable.6' But, on average, income ine- 
60.  Analysts have considered a variety of additional  policies, including financial 
market  policy, infrastructure  development,  and the exchange  rate  regime. 
61.  Deininger  and  Squire  (1996) report  data  for the income shares  of the top relative 
to the bottom quintile in a variety of countries in various years. According to this Susan M. Collins and Barry P. Bosworth  175 
quality in East Asia is similar to that in South Asia and in the Middle 
East. Malaysia, like the Philippines,  has quite high income inequality, 
comparable  to that in Latin America. Only Korea and Taiwan began 
with highly equitable income distributions;  the others enjoyed rising 
equality along with rapid  growth. 
The seven countries are now frequently  cited for high rates of in- 
vestment and saving. However, most began with low to moderate  in- 
vestment and saving rates. Dramatic  increases in saving rates, in par- 
ticular, are a hallmark of their successful development. Similarly, 
exports initially represented  a modest share of GDP, and very rapid 
export growth is another  striking feature that these countries have in 
common. 
There are also both similarities and differences in the policies pur- 
sued in the region.62  Overall, the East Asian countries  have tended to 
follow prudent  macroeconomic  policies,  as discussed further  below. 
Average fiscal deficits have been low, thus limiting the need for infla- 
tionary  finance. Public saving rates  have been relatively  high. Inflation 
rates  have tended  to be moderate  (although  not exceptionally  low); real 
interest rates have been quite stable; and black market  exchange rate 
premiums  have been very small. 
The broad averages mask considerable cross-country diversity. 
Budget deficits have not always been small, nor have inflation rates 
consistently been in single digits. In Thailand,  the central  government 
deficit ranged from 3.5 to 6.5 percent of GDP during the nine years 
from 1978 to 1986. Malaysia's budget deficit reached 15.5 percent  of 
GDP during 1981-82,  and averaged  6.9 percent over 1960-92.  Con- 
sumer  price index inflation  averaged  20 percent  per year during 1974- 
81 in Korea, and reached as high as 40 percent  per year in Indonesia 
in 1974. However, a key feature in all of these cases is that surges in 
budget deficits or inflation were reversed relatively quickly-govern- 
indicator,  the most equitable  East Asian countries  are Taiwan, China, and Indonesia, 
with ratios  between  4.5 and  5.5. Korea  and  Singapore  are  somewhat  less equitable,  with 
ratios of 6.3 and 6.7.  Least equitable  are Thailand  (11.7), the Philippines  (12.0), and 
Malaysia  (14.2). The regional averages  are 7.2 for East Asia, 5.5 for South Asia, 7.1 
for the Middle  East, 11.6 for Africa, 16.0 for Latin  America, and 6.6 among  industrial 
economies. 
62.  For  summaries  of the range  of policies pursued  in each of the high-growth  Asian 
countries,  see World  Bank (1993a) and its extensive references. 176  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
ments adjusted  policies promptly  when indicators  got far out of line.63 
Consequently,  economic crises in the high-performing  East  Asian coun- 
tries appear  to have been shorter  and less severe than many of those 
experienced  elsewhere. These countries  do not show that moderate  but 
persistent  inflation  or budget  deficits are inconsistent  with long periods 
of rapid growth, nor that there is any need to be preoccupied with 
doctrinaire  targets, such as zero inflation, or budget surpluses;  but, for 
the most part, they have avoided the extremes. In this regard, our 
reading  of the East Asian experience  in terms  of macroeconomic  policy 
and performance  is similar to that of Stanley Fischer.64 
The governments in the region promoted  broad-based  educational 
increases  through  the allocation, if not the level, of public spending.65 
Government expenditures tended to be concentrated on the lower 
grades, particularly  while literacy  rates  were low. Spending  at the post- 
secondary level was limited and focused on strengthening  technical 
skills. As shown above, the East  Asian countries  did achieve impressive 
increases  in the educational  attainment  of their  populations.  At the same 
time, our accounting decomposition implies that the direct effect of 
increased  schooling for growth  was modest  in East  Asia, adding  perhaps 
0.2 and  0.4 percentage  point  relative  to annual  growth  in Latin  America 
and Africa, respectively (see table 7). However, these figures do not 
take into account the potentially significant positive implications for 
per capita growth rates as increased education contributes to lower 
population  growth rates. 
In the early 1960s trade  policies in all of the East Asian economies 
(except Hong Kong) could be characterized  as promoting  import  sub- 
stitution, with strong  biases against  exports. Following Japan's  exam- 
ple, each shifted away from this inward-looking  development  strategy 
toward an outward-oriented  strategy  based on promoting  exports, es- 
pecially manufactured  goods. Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan  made the 
switch during  the mid- to late 1960s. Like Japan,  however, Korea and 
Taiwan  initially  maintained  significant  protection  of their  domestic  mar- 
kets and  promoted  exports  through  a variety  of selective measures,  such 
as export credits and tax incentives; the move away from extensive 
63.  See, for example, Collins (1989). 
64.  See Fischer  (1993). 
65.  Compared  with other countries, government  spending on education has been 
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usage of selective measures is quite recent. Korea's "big push" to 
develop heavy and chemical industries  during  the 1970s stands out as 
an example of very intensive intervention.  While Korean  development 
has been associated with very large conglomerates,  Taiwanese  export- 
ers are primarily  small and medium-sized  firms. Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Thailand  shifted to export  promotion  strategies  in the early 1980s. 
Their approaches  placed less emphasis  on targeted  intervention,  but in 
all cases some selective measures were used to promote designated 
industries. Finally, all of the countries encouraged  capital goods im- 
ports, licensing arrangements,  and  training  abroad  as means  to transfer 
more  efficient technologies from  the industrial  countries.  Foreign  direct 
investment, however, was welcomed in Malaysia and Singapore, and 
more recently in Indonesia  and Thailand,  but was heavily restricted  in 
Taiwan and especially Korea. 
Regression  Analysis 
The association between policies and growth is explored more for- 
mally through  regression analysis. A new feature  of our analysis is to 
use the components of growth-capital  accumulation  and changes in 
TFP-as  dependent  variables, which enables us to study the channels 
through  which the various policies operate. Following the existing lit- 
erature, we concentrate on macroeconomic policy and on outward- 
oriented  trade  policy. 
Our choice of indicators  of macroeconomic  policy is heavily influ- 
enced by the prior studies of Barro, Lee, and Fischer.66  In particular, 
we focus on the average budget balance as a share of GDP over the 
period 1960-92  as a broad measure of  fiscal discipline and on the 
variability  of the real exchange rate during 1960-92  as a measure of 
the stability  of macroeconomic  policy.67  While fiscal data are available 
for all but one country  in our sample (Sudan), they come from different 
sources, raising issues of comparability  and quality. The measures  of 
fiscal balance  for industrial  countries  come from OECD statistical  files 
and tend to be close to the standard  national accounts concept of the 
66.  Barro  (1991), Barro  and Lee (1994b), and Fischer  (1993). 
67.  In Bosworth,  Collins, and  Chen  (1996) we consider  other  macroeconomic  policy 
indicators,  such as the average  level and change in the real exchange  rate, the average 
level and standard  deviation of inflation, and the share of government  consumption  in 
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general government  sector. In most cases, data for developing econ- 
omies come from the IMF's International Financial  Statistics or World 
Bank studies and are based on the concept of the consolidated  general 
government budget. In a few cases,  data are based on the broader 
concept of the public sector budget. 
The real exchange rate measure  is based on the international  price of 
consumption  goods from the PWT;  as such, it provides an indicator  of 
under- or overvaluation  of the currency, relative to purchasing  power 
parity. There is, however, a general tendency for a country's relative 
price level to increase with income. Thus we follow the procedure 
developed  by David Dollar  to adjust  our  series for this systematic  bias.68 
The international  price of consumption,  converted  to U.S. dollars  using 
the standard  exchange rate, is regressed  on the ratio of per capita  GDP 
for each country relative to that of the United States. Residuals from 
this regression  are  used as adjusted  prices. Each  country's  real  exchange 
rate is then its adjusted  price level, relative to a sample average  that is 
constructed  using trade  weights. We also include various measures  of 
the level  and stability of inflation. However, these are consistently 
insignificant  in the regressions. 
Alternative  trade  policy measures  can be divided into three types.69 
First, there  are  direct  measures  of tariff  and  nontariff  barriers  (NTBs).70 
Second, there are those based on trade flows. Actual imports  and ex- 
ports  will differ across  countries  because  of country  size, factor  endow- 
ments, and other features that have nothing to do with policy stance. 
Thus it has become common to estimate a "gravity," or a structural, 
model of trade  flows and to assume that  the regression  residuals  reflect 
the underlying  policy stance.7'  Finally, a number  of authors  have con- 
structed  qualitative indexes of trade  policy, based on a variety of un- 
68.  Dollar (1992). 
69.  See Bosworth, Collins, and Chen (1996) and the references  therein  for further 
discussion  of this issue. 
70.  NTBs, arguably  more important  than  tariff  barriers  in terms  of industrial  target- 
ing, are notoriously  difficult to measure. Furthermore,  the comparable  comprehensive 
figures (from the United Nations Conference  on Trade  and Development [UNCTAD]) 
are for the mid-1980s, not the early years of East Asia's economic take-off. 
71.  This procedure  can be applied  to total imports  or to categories, such as imports 
of consumer  versus capital  goods. However, adjusted  trade  flow measures  tend to have 
low correlations  with direct trade  policy measures  and are likely to be endogenous. In 
any case, the association between adjusted  trade shares and output growth does not 
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derlying indicators. These tend to enter growth regressions  with large 
and very significant  coefficients, compared  with direct and trade  flow 
measures.  However, they may provide  relatively  poor proxies for trade 
policy, as discussed further  below. Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew  Warner 
have recently developed one such measure. They define a country as 
closed if any of the following five conditions applied  during 1970-89, 
and open otherwise:  (1) NTBs covering at least 40 percent  of trade, (2) 
average tariff rates of at least 40 percent, (3) an average  black market 
premium  of at least 20 percent during the 1970s or the 1980s, (4) a 
socialist economic system, and (5) a state  monopoly  on major  exports.72 
While our  previous  work  has employed  all three  types of trade  policy 
measure, the present discussion focuses on the results based on the 
Sachs and Warner  measure of openness, for two reasons.73  First, we 
wish to explore further  the significance  of measures  that  previous anal- 
yses have found to show the importance  of outward-oriented  trade  pol- 
icy as a determinant  of growth.  The arguably  preferable  direct  and  trade 
flow measures  do not seem to be significantly  related  to growth  perfor- 
mance. Our  previous analysis finds that neither  the tariff nor the NTB 
measures  were significantly  associated  with growth  or its components. 
We have found  some evidence that  an adjusted  measure  of capital  goods 
imports  as a share of GDP is associated with more rapid  capital accu- 
mulation, but no evidence of any link with productivity  growth.74  Sec- 
ond, the Sachs-Warner  index is available for eighty-three  of the coun- 
tries in our sample, whereas  alternative  indicators  would have reduced 
our sample size much further.75 
Table 11 provides  a summary  of the macroeconomic  and  trade  policy 
indicators for individual East Asian countries and for the regional 
groupings. As shown, real exchange rates have been relatively stable 
in East  Asia. The region  is characterized  by low average  budget  deficits, 
comparable  to those among industrial  countries, and less than half of 
72.  Sachs and Warner  (1995). 
73.  Bosworth,  Collins, and  Chen  (1996). In the present  paper,  our  empirical  analysis 
uses revised data  obtained  directly  from Sachs and Warner. 
74.  Bosworth,  Collins, and Chen (1996). 
75.  The eighty-three-country  sample excludes Iceland, Malta, Panama,  South Af- 
rica, and Sudan. An alternative  qualitative  indicator  constructed  by the World Bank 
(1987) produces  results similar to those using the Sachs and Warner  indicator. The 
results for direct and trade  flow measures  and the World  Bank indicator  are based on 
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the level in Latin America, for example. Finally, East Asia stands  out 
as extremely open, based on the openness indicator borrowed from 
Sachs and Warner.  From  the percentage  of country  years classified as 
open during 1960-92,  East Asia (75 percent) is second only to the 
industrial  economies (91 percent),  and  considerably  more  open than  the 
Middle East (31 percent), the third most open region. In the other 
regions, few,  if any, countries are classified as open over the entire 
period. This indicator  is very successful in singling out the East Asian 
economies. 
Regression results are reported  in table 12.76 The role of macroeco- 
nomic policy is considered first. As shown, countries with smaller 
budget deficits and more stable real exchange rates tend to grow more 
rapidly. However, the two elements of policy work through  very dif- 
ferent channels. Budget surpluses are strongly associated with more 
rapid accumulation  of capital per worker, while real exchange rate 
stability is associated with improved  (or higher)  productivity  growth. 
We find the Sachs-Warner  index of years open to be strongly asso- 
ciated with growth. Sachs and Warner's  interpretation  is that an open 
trade  policy is the most important  element of overall economic policy: 
if and only if poorer countries are open will they tend to grow more 
rapidly  than richer  countries and to catch up. Further,  they argue that 
the main reason to expect the convergence of open economies is that 
poorer countries can import capital and modern technology  from 
wealthier  ones, thereby  reaping "the advantages  of backwardness."77 
Our results create some difficulty for this interpretation  because the 
variable  adds nothing to the explanation  of differences in productivity 
growth (see column 8). All of its influence comes through  a positive 
effect on accumulation  of capital per worker (see column 5). To the 
extent that the indicator  is assumed  to capture  outward  orientation,  the 
lack of evidence that  this policy stance is linked to the transfer  of more 
efficient production  techniques  is striking. 
However, the Sachs-Warner  index, like other  categorical  indicators, 
may have little to say about the underlying  trade policies. It places a 
heavy weight on the premium  (discount)  in the black  market  for foreign 
76.  These  regressions  are  all based  on a sample  size of eighty-three.  For  comparative 
purposes, the regressions with initial and external conditions were run again for the 
eighty-three-country  subsample,  yielding only minor  changes in the results. 
77.  Sachs and Warner  (1995, p. 3). 4  k-  00  00  M  oooo 
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exchange. The black market  premium  is not a measure  of trade  policy, 
per se,  but rather is likely to strongly reflect the general economic 
condition of a country. The reliance on the black market  premium  is 
also likely to make problems of endogeneity especially acute. More 
generally, the Sachs and Warner  openness indicator  is as strongly  cor- 
related with our macroeconomic  policy indicators  (budget surplus  and 
real exchange rate stability) as with the direct trade policy measures 
(tariff and nontariff  barriers).  Finally, categorical  measures  force stark 
distinctions among countries, but it is unclear whether these really 
reflect underlying differences in trade policy. Such indicators  do not 
capture underlying differences in the nature and extent of  selective 
government  interventions  at the industry  level. 
We conclude that  categorical  indicators  like the Sachs-Warner  index 
do appear  to be signficantly  correlated  with growth. But the channel  of 
effectiveness  is increasing capital accumulation, not productivity 
growth. Furthermore,  problems  with this measure  imply that  we cannot 
draw  conclusions about  the role of trade  policies or selective interven- 
tion from these results. To do so would require measures that more 
accurately  capture  differences in trade  policy. 
Overall, the policy measures  account  for about  one-third  of the other- 
wise unexplained  difference between growth  performance  in East Asia 
and other developing regions. That is, the size of the regional coeffi- 
cients in column 3 of table 12 are about one-third smaller than the 
regional  effects in column  2 of table 10. Further,  the reduction  is evenly 
divided between capital accumulation  and TFP growth. 
Concluding Thoughts 
Our examination of the data for East Asia produces several major 
questions. Two of these follow from the finding that East Asia is dis- 
tinguished  by the magnitude  of capital accumulation,  but that gains in 
productivity  have been quite ordinary.  First, why has TFP growth  been 
so moderate,  given the obvious opportunities  to simply copy the tech- 
nologies of the industrial  economies? And second, what enabled the 
East Asian economies to achieve and  maintain  such high rates  of capital 
accumulation?  The third  questions Krugman's  provocative  conclusion 
that if past growth was due to rapid capital accumulation,  the law of Susan M. Collins and Barry P. Bosworth  185 
diminishing  returns  would imply that  East Asia's days of rapid  growth 
are numbered.78  Is this assessment correct? Finally, the finding that 
TFP growth  has played only a limited role casts doubt  on the relevance 
of much of the new growth  theory, which suggests that the transfer  of 
ideas provides a less costly means of economic catchup than capital 
accumulation. 
Why Was TFP Growth So Modest? 
Previous growth accounting studies have found large contributions 
from TFP for industrial  countries  that enjoyed periods of rapid  output 
growth.79  We find similar  TFP contributions  for industrial  countries  in 
the earliest period of our sample. Table 7 shows that the average  con- 
tribution  of TFP to growth of output  per worker  during 1960-73 was 
2.1 percentage  points among all non-U.S. industrial  countries-more 
than  twice its contribution  (0.9 percentage  points) in the United States. 
Six of the seven industrial  countries  with the highest growth  had annual 
contributions of TFP to output growth of at least 2.6  percentage 
points.80  A common explanation  for these large TFP contributions  has 
been that  other industrial  countries  were catching  up with the technical 
expertise of the United States. Why did East Asia not have a similar 
experience?  Much of the East Asian growth  occurred  after 1973, when 
TFP gains were smaller  throughout  the industrial  economies; but given 
the magnitude  of the technology gap, it is difficult to see why devel- 
opments at the frontier were of relevance to East Asia. To varying 
degrees, the East Asian economies followed Japan  in pursuing  a devel- 
opment strategy that involved sequenced promotion  of low,  middle, 
78.  Krugman  (1994). 
79.  For example, Denison and  Chung  (1976) find  that  TFP  growth  contributed  from 
1.9 to 4.9 percentage  points per year to growth  for nine industrial  countries  (those with 
at least 3 percent  annual  average  growth)  over various  periods  between 1948 and 1971. 
Christenson, Cummings, and Jorgenson (1980) find that the contribution  of TFP to 
growth  for eight industrial  countries  over selected periods  within 1947-73 ranged  from 
1.4 to 4.1 percentage  points per year. For a variety  of reasons, these TFP estimates  are 
not strictly  comparable  to ours, which helps to explain their magnitudes.  In particular, 
Denison's estimates  apply to net, not gross, output. 
80.  These countries  (with annual  percentage  point contributions  from productivity 
growth  during 1960-73 in parentheses)  are Greece (3.6), Italy (2.6), Japan  (3.3), Por- 
tugal (3.8), Spain (3.3),  and Turkey  (2.6). The contribution  of TFP growth  in Austria 
was 1.9 percentage  points per year. In all of these countries,  the annual  growth  rate of 
output  per worker  was at least 4.8 percent. 186  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
and high technology industries. But unlike Japan  in the 1960s, their 
increases in TFP have been modest. 
It is possible that the potential to adopt knowledge and technology 
from abroad  depends  on a country's  stage of development.81  Growth  in 
the early stages may be primarily  associated with physical and human 
capital accumulation, and significant potential for growth through 
catchup may only emerge once a country has crossed some develop- 
mental  threshold.  Gene Grossman  and  Elhanan  Helpman  may be correct 
in arguing  that even if "technological progress  provides the engine of 
long-run  growth, accumulation  will play an independent  role during  a 
(perhaps  prolonged)  transitional  phase.  '  82 
To explore this hypothesis of stages of growth, we compare  devel- 
opment indicators  for the East Asian countries  in 1975 with indicators 
in 1965 for the six industrial  countries with the highest TFP growth 
rates during 1960-73. The Asian countries  were indeed less developed 
than their high-growth  industrial  counterparts.  On average, the indus- 
trial countries had more than a year of additional  schooling, as well 
more than three times the amount  of capital per worker. Less than a 
third  of their labor force was employed in agriculture,  compared  with 
nearly half for the Asian countries. While these comparisons  do not 
provide a formal test, they are consistent with the view that the low 
TFP growth  in East Asia during 1960-94 (or 1973-94) relative to that 
in high-growth  industrial  economies during  the 1960s is due in part  to 
the Asian economies' being at an earlier stage of development. Also 
consistent  with the stages of development  hypothesis  is that  TFP  growth 
accelerated  sharply  after 1984 in many of these countries. 
High  Capital Accumulation 
The East Asian economies are most remarkable  for the magnitude  of 
their capital accumulation. An important  implication of the analysis 
81.  The idea that countries  pass through  different  stages of development,  and that 
to embark  on a stage in which growth is characterized  by significant technological 
improvements  might require  certain preconditions,  was widely discussed in the early 
economic  development  literature;  see, for example, Rostow (1960). Recent  studies  have 
used modern  analytic  tools to revisit the potential  importance  of developmental  stages. 
For example, Azariadis and Drazen (1990) develop a model of economic growth in 
which returns  to scale rise rapidly  once economic characteristics  such as labor quality 
reach  a critical  range. 
82.  Grossman  and Helpman  (1994, p. 26). Susan M. Collins and Barry P. Bosworth  187 
above is that  this impressive  achievement  should  be the focus of future 
work that seeks to draw  lessons from the region's rapid  growth. In this 
context, it is useful to highlight the key features  of the experience. 
Figure 4 shows the historical pattern  of saving and investment  as a 
percentage  of GDP for the six high performing  countries. While there 
are obvious differences among them, there are also some common 
features. First, rates of national saving rose throughout  the period of 
accelerating  growth, providing  a striking  example of a virtuous  circle 
in which  rising  rates  of capital  formation  and  growth  fed on one another. 
Indonesia, Korea, and Singapore began with relatively low rates of 
saving (as did Taiwan, in the 1950s). The data  certainly  do not support 
the hypothesis that high saving in East Asia is due to some cultural 
predisposition. The great expansion of saving in Singapore was the 
result of a program  of mandated  saving, and the surge in saving in 
Thailand  in the late 1980s was concentrated  in the public sector. But 
for the other  countries,  it is difficult  to relate  the pattern  of rising saving 
directly  to any specific government  policies. Most of these governments 
have followed very conservative  financial  market  policies, emphasizing 
the avoidance  of crises and generally  maintaining  positive real interest 
rates. Furthermore,  open bond and equity markets  have played a rela- 
tively minor  role in the financing  of investment,  relative  to institutional 
lending. 
In addition, several of the countries depended heavily on foreign 
capital  inflows to finance  the initial surge  of investment.  For Korea, the 
capital inflow averaged 6 percent of GDP throughout  the 1960s and 
1970s. Singapore relied even more on capital inflows, until the mid- 
1980s. More recently, both Singapore  and Taiwan  have experienced  a 
significant  falloff in domestic investment, and they are now generating 
large capital outflows. 
The Outlook for  Future Growth 
Krugman,  among  others, has suggested  that  East  Asia's growth  must 
slow in the future because of what he characterizes  as an excessive 
reliance  on capital formation.  Over time, a rapid  rate of growth in the 
capital stock-a  rate well in excess of growth  in output-should  push 
down the return  to capital and ultimately divert investment to other 
regions. And it is true that figure  4 shows the investment  rate slowing Figure 4. Saving-Investment  Balance,  Selected  East Asian Countries 
Percent  of GDP 
35  Indonesia  Domestic  Korea  A 
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Table 13. Output  and Capital  per Worker, Selected  Countries,  1970 and  1994 
Index, United States 1970  =  100, except as indicated 
Physical 
Output  per  capital per  Education per  Capital-to- 
worker  worker  workera  output ratiob 
Country  1970  1994  1970  1994  1970  1994  1970  1994 
China  3.2  10.4  1.5  6.6  56.4  65.3  1.5  1.7 
Indonesia  6.8  15.1  2.5  16.2  58.0  69.0  1.2  2.8 
Korea  13.2  52.9  5.0  49.4  74.3  95.3  1.2  2.9 
Malaysia  18.9  46.8  8.1  37.8  63.1  77.2  1.3  2.5 
Philippines  10.9  13.4  4.1  8.5  73.3  88.3  1.2  2.0 
Singapore  30.0  77.3  13.0  72.5  65.2  74.9  1.4  2.9 
Thailand  8.4  26.7  3.0  15.2  61.4  76.4  1.1  1.8 
Taiwan  18.5  67.7  7.2  47.6  68.9  87.9  1.2  2.2 
Japan  44.0  85.5  30.9  124.9  79.8  92.7  2.2  4.6 
United States  100.0  118.5  100.0  122.5  100.0  110.2  3.1  3.2 
Source: Authors' calculations using data sources for table 6. Numbers are converted to U.S.  dollars by using purchasing 
power parity exchange rates for 1970 from the Penn-World Tables, mark 5.6. 
a. Indexed level of the labor quality measure, H. 
b. Actual ratio. 
in Singapore  and Taiwan. Yet the other  countries  continue  to be highly 
popular  destinations  for foreign capital, and  recent  experience  does not 
seem to support  any notion of a major  slowing of growth. 
To examine the outlook for East Asia, we construct measures of 
income and capital per worker, using international  price data.83  Key 
aspects are summarized  in table 13. These figures  show that  despite the 
rapidity  of the past growth, most of these countries  still have a consid- 
erable distance to go before they reach levels of output per worker 
comparable  to those in the United States. Furthermore,  their stocks of 
physical capital  per worker  are still quite low-generally  less than  half 
of those of the United States and Japan. 
Krugman  is certainly  right  to say that  these countries  cannot  continue 
to assume that capital per worker  will expand in excess of the growth 
in labor-augmenting  technical  change, without  significant  reductions  in 
the return  to capital. However, it is important  to incorporate  two off- 
setting factors, each of which provides  grounds  for optimism. First, the 
quality-weighted  labor force will continue  to expand  as a consequence 
83.  The use of international price data, drawn from the latest version  of the PWT, 
makes comparison  possible  across  countries.  However,  even  the estimates  from com- 
parable international prices are subject to substantial uncertainty. 190  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
of improvements  in average education levels. Even though the levels 
of education  of young age cohorts in these countries  are comparable  to 
their counterparts  in the United States and Japan, the passage of time 
alone will raise the average educational  level as older, less educated 
workers  leave the labor force. On the basis of our simple index, labor 
quality in these countries is still 20 to 30 percent below that of the 
United States. A second factor is the apparent  improvement  in TFP 
growth over the past decade, particularly  in Korea, Singapore, Thai- 
land, and Taiwan (see table 7). Our data suggest that these countries 
have hardly  exhausted  the potential  for catching up. 
As table 13 shows, all of these countries  have experienced  a major 
rise in the capital-to-output  ratio, which would be expected to have 
driven down the return  to capital. Korea and Singapore, for example, 
now have capital-to-output  ratios comparable to that of  the United 
States, suggesting  that  they may face significant  limits on future  capital 
accumulation without commensurate  increases in TFP; but for both 
countries, the ratios are still well short of Japan's. Most of the other 
countries, however, have capital-to-output  ratios that imply consider- 
able capacity for further  capital deepening. In sum, there appears  to be 
room for high growth to continue in East Asia before the countries  of 
this region converge to the performance  levels that characterize  the 
industrial  economies. Susan M. Collins and Barry P. Bosworth  191 
APPENDIX  A 
Country  Sample 
THE EIGHTY-EIGHT countries in our sample,  in their regional groupings 
are as follows: 
China  Middle  East  Industrial  countries 
East Asia  (with  North  Africa)  Australia 
Indonesia  Algeria  Austria 
Korea  Cyprus  Belgium 
Malaysia  Egypt  Canada 
Philippins  .Iran  Denmark 
Pilappies  Israel  Finland  Singapore  Jordan  France 
Thailand  Malta  Germany 
Morocco  Greece 
South  Asia  Tunisia  Iceland 
Bangladesh  Latin  America  Ireland 
India 
Argentina  Italy 
Myanmar  Bolivia  Japan 
Pakistan  Brazil  Netherlands 
Sri Lanka  Bhile  New Zealand 
Africa  (sub-Saharan)  Columbia  Norway 
Cameroon  Costa  Rica  Portugal 
Cote d'Ivoire  Dominican  Republic  Spain 
Ethiopia  Ecuador  Sweden 
Ghana  El Salvador  Switzerland 
Kenya  Guatemala  Turkey 
Madagascar  Guyana  United Kingdom 
Malawi  Haiti  United  States 
Mali  Honduras 
Mauritius  Jamaica 
Mozambique  Mexico 
Nigeria  Nicaragua 
Rwanda  Panama 
Senegal  Paraguay 
Sierra  Leone  Peru 
South  Africa  Trinidad  and  Tobago 
Sudan  Uruguay 





Dani Rodrik: It is a rare  treat  to read  a serious paper  on East Asia that 
does not have an axe to grind. The present study deserves credit on 
these grounds alone. Collins and Bosworth have done a nice job of 
amassing new evidence on the sources of growth for a broad cross- 
section of countries.  And  their  interpretation  of the evidence is balanced 
and judicious. My main disappointment  is that they do not take the 
logic of their findings far enough, and therefore  leave the reader  with 
something less than a complete story. 
I make three broad  points here. The first  concerns  the shortcomings 
of the authors' TFP growth calculations; the second is about how to 
squeeze additional  information  out of the cross-country  regressions;  and 
the third  concerns the role of government  policy in stimulating  private 
investment. 
What Do the TFP Growth Calculations  Really Show? Along with all 
the other researchers who have undertaken  careful analyses of the 
sources of growth, Collins and Bosworth  find  that East Asia presents  a 
miracle of accumulation  (of physical capital, in particular)  rather  than 
of productivity. However, the evidence on this issue is less clear-cut 
than would seem at first sight. While the evidence on investment  rates 
is direct and speaks for itself, the evidence on TFP is indirect  and has 
to be intrepreted  with care. A general theorem derived by Peter Dia- 
mond, Daniel McFadden,  and Miguel Rodriguez  says that it is impos- 
sible to disentangle factor-augmenting  technological change from the 
shape of the production  function (and, in particular,  from its elasticity 
of substitution).1  In the present context, this implies that researchers 
1. Diamond, McFadden,  and Rodriguez  (1978). 
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Table Bi.  Total Factor Productivity  Growth  Rates and Capital  Shares  Implied  by 
Alternative  Assumptions  about  Factor Substitution,  East Asiaa 
Units as indicated 
Implied total factor productivity 
growthb  Implied capital sharec 
Elasticity of  After 10  After 20  After 30  After 10  After 20  After 30 
substitution  years  years  years  years  years  years 
1.0  1.03  1.03  1.03  0.35  0.35  0.35 
0.9  1.14  1.25  1.36  0.33  0.32  0.30 
0.8  1.28  1.51  1.73  0.31  0.28  0.24 
0.7  1.44  1.81  2.13  0.29  0.23  0.18 
0.6  1.66  2.16  2.53  0.25  0.18  0.12 
0.5  1.93  2.53  2.89  0.21  0.12  0.06 
0.4  2.27  2.89  3.15  0.16  0.06  0.02 
0.3  2.68  3.17  3.27  0.10  0.02  0.00 
0.2  3.09  3.29  3.30  0.03  0.00  0.00 
0.1  3.29  3.30  3.30  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Source: Author's calculations based on output and factor accumulation data provided by Collins and Bosworth. 
a. Calculated for the sample of countries compiled by Collins and Bosworth (see appendix A to their paper in this volume), 
using input and output growth rates for the period 1960-94.  Calculations assume an initial capital share of 0.35. 
b. Annual percentage rate as calculated after given number of years and assuming given elasticity of substitution. 
c. Calculated using equation B 1. 
may be misattributing  labor-augmenting  technical change in East Asia 
to an assumed elasticity of substitution  that is too high, with the con- 
sequence that TFP growth is underestimated. 
To see how this might  happen, and  how serious  the implications  are, 
here is a small exercise based on the Collins-Bosworth  calculations  for 
rates of factor accumulation.  The authors  assume that the production 
functions are of the Cobb-Douglas form, with a capital share (a)  of 
0.35.  This imposes an elasticity of substitution  between capital and 
labor  (including  skills) of unity. Suppose, instead, that  the true  elastic- 
ity of substitution  is below unity. Then capital deepening  would cause 
the factor share of capital to fall over time (but see below). For given 
rates  of capital  deepening  and  output  growth,  the residual  output  growth 
attributed  to TFP growth would increase correspondingly.  This effect 
would be particularly  strong in the East Asian countries, as they have 
experienced  the greatest  capital deepening. 
Table B1 shows the magnitudes involved. Collins and Bosworth 
calculate  an annual  TFP growth  rate of slightly over 1 percent  per year 
for East Asia, over the period 1960-94.  This is shown in the first row 
of table B 1. The remaining  rows display the implied TFP growth  rates 194  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
under different assumptions about the elasticity of substitution. For 
example, with an elasticity of  substitution  of 0.5,  the implied TFP 
growth rate would rise to 1.93 percent in ten years, 2.53 percent in 
twenty years, and 2.89 percent  in thirty  years. Clearly, the lower one's 
priors  about  the elasticity of substitution,  the higher  one must presume 
TFP growth  rates to have been in East Asia. 
One defense of the unitary elasticity of substitution  might be that 
one does not actually observe the reductions  in the capital share that 
would be implied by low elasticities of substitution  (as displayed in 
table B  1).2  But this is misleading because of the indeterminacy  noted 
above. This indeterminacy  has to do with the fact that a reduction in 
the marginal  productivity  of capital can be cushioned either by a high 
elasticity of substitution  or by labor-augmenting  technical change. My 
calculations have assumed that TFP growth is unbiased. Suppose, in- 
stead, that it was labor-augmenting;  that is, that it favored  the marginal 
productivity  of capital. In that case, one would not have observed any 
significant  decline in the capital share. 
Formally, the rate of change of the capital share  can be expressed  as 
(B  1)  a  r(  at) [a',-  k], 
(Bi)~~~~~~~~( 
where a  is the elasticity of substitution,  aL  is the labor-augmentation 
factor,  k is the capital-to-labor ratio, and hats denote percentage 
changes. As the equation  shows, there is an observational  equivalence 
between labor-augmenting  technical  change (aL) and a a close to unity. 
The capital share (a) can remain constant for either reason, and one 
cannot distinguish  empirically which one is the cause.3 Therefore  one 
would have to place very strong  priors  on the likelihood that a is equal 
to one, or on the neutrality  of technical change, in order  to be able to 
rule out a significant  amount  of labor-augmenting  technical change. 
Cross-Country Regressions.  Collins and Bosworth are right to stress 
the importance  of macroeconomics-conservative  fiscal policies and 
2.  The evidence  on this  point is  not so clear cut either.  It appears that profit rates 
and profit shares  in Korean  manufacturing  have  fallen  substantially  since  the  1970s. 
Singh  (1996,  table  15) reports that the gross  profit share in Korean manufacturing fell 
from 46 percent in  1975 to 33 percent in  1990. 
3.  See  also Nelson  and Pack (1995),  who argue, in the East Asian context,  that the 
strong diminishing  returns to capital that would otherwise  have followed  were offset  by 
technical  advance. Susan M. Collins and Barry P. Bosworth  195 
Table  B2. Regressing  Growth  on Alternative  Indicators  of Government  Policy, 
East Asiaa 
Independent variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Per  capita  incomeb  -0.05*  -0.06*  -0.05* 
Life expectancyc  0.03  0.02  0.02 
Years  of schoolingd  0.11  0.04 
Change  in terms  of tradec  0.01  -0.09  -0.07 
Standard  deviation  of terms  of trade'  -0.03  0.02  0.01 
Budget  balanceg  0.07t  0.05  0.06t 
Standard  deviation  of real  exchange  - 0.03t  0.00  0.00 
rateh 
Sachs-Warner  dummyi  0.58t  0.12  . . . 
Black market premium  .  .  .  -  0.66*  -  0.72* 
Institutional qualityi  .  .  .  0.41*  0.41 * 
Schooling/initial  income  .  . .  .  . .  1  .85t 
Summary statistic 
R?  2  0.68  0.79  0.80 
Source: Author's regressions, as described in text. Data on institutional quality are from Knack and Keefer (1995).  Data 
on openness are from Sachs and Warner  (1995),  but differ slightly from those used by Collins and Bosworth in this volume. 
Data on all other variables were provided by Collins and Bosworth; for sources, see table 11 of their paper in this volume. 
a. The dependent variable is the growth rate of output per worker. The country sample differs slightly from that used by 
Collins and Bosworth in their tables 11 and 12. The sample period is 1960-94.  All regressions include regional dummies. 
* indicates significance at the 5 percent level; t  indicates significance at the I percent level. 
b. Percent of U.S.  level,  1960. 
c.  Years,  1960. 
d. Average for the adult population,  1965. 
e.  Mean of annual log changes ( x  100),  1965-92. 
f.  Standard  deviation of annual log changes ( x  100),  1965-92. 
g. Average percent of GDP,  1960-92  (period covered begins after 1960 for many countries). 
h. Standard  deviation of annual log changes ( x  100),  1960-92. 
i. Sachs and Warner assessment: one indicates open during 1970-89,  zero indicates closed. 
j.  Knack and Keefer index: I indicates worst,  10 indicates best. 
equilibrium  exchange rates, in particular-in East Asia's success. This 
is probably the only noncontroversial  lesson from the region. But I 
think that they could have teased more out of the regressions. 
The regressions  in table B2 make  two points. First, institutions  mat- 
ter. One respect in which East Asia has stood out among developing 
regions is the quality of its bureaucracy.  An index of the quality of 
governmental  institutions (encompassing measures of the security of 
property  and contractual  rights and  of bureaucratic  quality)  enters  very 
significantly in the regressions (columns 2 and 3).4  Since the index 
ranges from 1 to 10, the estimated  coefficient indicates quite a strong 
effect from institutional  quality: a difference of almost 4 percentage 
points in growth  per worker  between the worst institution  and the best. 
4.  Knack  and Keefer (1995). The index is constructed  using original  data from the 
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Second, East Asia is special for having had a skilled work force 
relative to its capital stock in the early stages of development. This 
raised the return  to capital and would account for the faster rates of 
capital  accumulation.  I use the ratio  of initial schooling  to initial income 
as a proxy for the gap between labor quality and physical capital. The 
value of this measure for East Asia is twice that for the rest of the 
world. Even though  schooling does not enter  significantly  in the regres- 
sions on its own, it does become significant  when  normalized  by income 
(column 3). 
Hence these regressions  provide  a fuller picture  of the cross-country 
evidence, emphasizing  the importance  of fiscal and exchange rate pol- 
icies, bureaucratic  institutions, and labor skills (relative to income). 
Government Policy and Investment. The regressions in table B2 leave 
unexplained a  1 to  1.5  percentage point differential of  growth per 
worker  in East Asia relative to Latin  America  and Africa. Therefore  it 
is necessary to complement the statistical work with a more detailed 
look at the individual experiences of these countries. Since capital 
accumulation  is such an important  part of the picture (even if labor- 
augmenting  technical progress  has been underestimated),  one must ask 
what could have triggered  the rise in the private  return  to capital that, 
in turn, induced  a rise in the investment-to-GDP  ratio  of 20 percentage 
points in Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia between the early 1960s and 
early 1980s, and of  15 percentage points in Thailand in less than a 
decade since the mid-1980s. 
Answering this question requires  more of a case study (or perhaps 
event study) approach.  My conjecture,  based at least on the Korean  and 
Taiwanese  experiences, is that  governments  were heavily implicated  in 
many of these leaps to high-investment  equilibria. In both Korea and 
Taiwan, it is clear that the governments  single-mindedly pursued  in- 
vestment and growth (from 1960 in Taiwan and from the early 1960s 
in Korea). In support  of these goals, they deployed a wide range of 
policies, including  administrative  guidance, credit  subsidies, tax incen- 
tives, public  enterprises  (to produce  the intermediates  needed  by private 
industry  downstream),  tariff  protection,  and  the socialization  of invest- 
ment  risk. Any story  about  the transformation  of these economies would 
be seriously incomplete without these elements. 
At the other extreme, it is worth pondering  why Hong Kong is the 
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investment  to GDP. As a reasonable  first guess, this might be because 
Hong Kong's government  has pursued  a laissez-faire approach  to eco- 
nomic policy and, unlike  the others, has never  developed  an investment 
srategy. This is further  evidence that activist government  policies had 
a part  in the other  countries'  leaps from low-investment  to high-invest- 
ment equilibria. 
Barry P. Bosworth: Rodrick  suggests that a constant  capital share, in 
the face of substantial  capital deepening, could result from either an 
elasticity of factor substitution  equal to unity or, alternatively,  an elas- 
ticity of substitution  well below unity  but offset by a high rate  of labor- 
augmenting  technical change. While these two situations imply quite 
different production  functions, our results are little different in either 
case. Our decomposition  of output  growth between capital accumula- 
tion and TFP depends on the stability of capital's share, not on the 
elasticity of substitution.  If the constancy is the result of a low degree 
of substitution  and  labor-augmenting  technical  change, the contribution 
of capital is not missed by our methodology:  in the context of a Divisia 
index, capital's share  of income is still the correct  measure  of its role, 
and the technology gains still show up as an increase in TFP. Rodrick 
is right, however, that  the importance  of technical  change  in preventing 
what would otherwise be a major erosion of capital's contribution  is 
not sufficiently  highlighted. Furthermore,  the intepretation  of the tech- 
nical change term would be different if it were labor augmenting,  be- 
cause it would equal the residual  divided by labor's share. 
Is it possible that labor-augmented  technical change could have 
maintained  balance between the growth in the stock of capital and the 
effective labor supply? Over the period 1960-94,  the increase in the 
capital-to-labor  ratio  ranged  from seven-fold in Indonesia  to more than 
twenty-fold in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. A rate of labor-aug- 
menting  technical  change of equivalent  magnitude,  even when reduced 
by labor's share, would have implied increases in the computed  TFP 
growth rates far in excess of those that we find. The assumption  of a 
constant  capital share is obviously important  to our conclusions;  but it 
is consistent  with the finding  of stable shares  for the industrial  countries 
in the presence  of similar  variations  in the rate  of capital  accumulation; 
and  Young finds little or no evidence of a decline in capital's share  for 
Korea  or Taiwan. 198  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
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